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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Long March of the German 68ers: Their Protest, Their Exhibition, and Their 
Administration 
 
 
by 
 
Gracie M. Morton 
 
 
 
The postwar children coming of age in the late 1960s in West Germany mounted a wide-
sweeping socio-political protest against what they saw as the strangling silence of their 
parents, the Nazi generation.  These protesters, referred to as the 68ers for their pivotal 
year, continued their struggle in following decades, incorporating an important and 
controversial exhibition, and finally culminating in their own administration thirty years 
from their defining moment.  Using such diverse kinds of information as parliamentary 
debates, interviews, and contemporary criticism, this thesis explores the impact of the 
68ers’ initial protest and the influence they ultimately had on their nation and society.  
The 68ers changed the face of German society by forcing a dialogue with the past that 
made a full exploration of the Nazi generation possible in Germany.  They also 
incorporated gender politics into their protest and forced a social revolution that allowed 
a woman to be elected Chancellor.   
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CHAPTER 1 
DIE NACHKRIEGSKINDER 
There was a strange dichotomy in the West German society of the 1960s: on the 
one hand there were the Nachkriegskinder (the postwar children) who challenged those 
they believed to be Nazis in the government of the Federal Republic; and on the other 
hand there were numerous West Germans who were tired of the seemingly endless guilt 
for National Socialism.  The student activists of the Nachkriegskinder who strove to 
expose fascism in their society would eventually be called 68ers for the most explosive 
year, 1968, a year marked by violence and protest.  But there is an irony to the 68ers.  By 
the time they began their protests in the mid to late 1960s, their parents’ generation (the 
Nazi generation) was busy attempting to erase their guilt in many ways: balancing guilt 
with personal suffering; staunch philo-Semitism; and reparations payments to victims of 
National Socialism.  This generation, called the silent generation by their children, for the 
most part found discussing their National Socialist past too difficult.  There were histories 
and other books being written, but these were largely esoteric studies done by experts 
which did not venture beyond the academic realm.  “It is entirely symptomatic when the 
writer Marcel Reich-Ranicki relates in his autobiography The Author of Himself that the 
first person in post-Nazi Germany to ask him about his concentration camp experiences 
was a journalist, in the late 1960s.  Her name was Ulrike Meinhof, the future terrorist.”1 
In protest against this silence and what the student activists saw as the hypocrisy 
and rampant materialism of a West Germany democratic government that employed 
many former Nazis, the 68ers revolted against everything they believed their parents 
                                                
1 Stephan and Norbert Lebert, My Father’s Keeper: Children of Nazi Leaders—an Intimate History of 
Damage and Denial, trans. Julian Evans (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2001), 190. 
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represented.  The activism of the German 68ers “was especially motivated by a sense of 
shock about National Socialism, which, however, was soon instrumentalized to cast 
doubt on German and middle-class ways of thinking and life-styles and on the social 
order in general.”2  In West Germany in the 1960s, that social order included a close 
relationship with the United States and Israel.  Sparked in part by the Vietnam War and in 
part by tensions in the Middle East, many students demonstrated against America and 
Israel and protested, ironically, in favor of Palestinians, their generation’s “Jewish” 
victims.  In turning their backs on everything their parents had come to represent, some 
of these activists eventually became anti-Semitic. 
 In West Germany in the 1960s there was a precarious balance between many who 
were tired of Nazi guilt and leftist activists who wanted to force their fellow Germans to 
confront history.  But the Nachkriegskinder felt no responsibility for Nazi crimes; they 
bore the consequence of the guilt without having committed the acts responsible for the 
guilt.  They had to bow under the pressure of this burden without understanding why.  
Their parents refused to address history at home and the details of the subject were taboo 
socially.  What the postwar generation learned about National Socialist history they 
acquired outside the home.  Young West Germans were exposed to facts about the Nazis 
and their crimes (books, plays, highly publicized trials), but reticence reigned at home.  
Unspoken guilt for having supported or participated in a criminal government and painful 
memories of personal suffering (i.e., the firebombing of Dresden and starvation rations) 
created in the typical West German home something psychologist Margarete Hecker 
                                                
2 Christian Meier, “Condemning and Comprehending,” in Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? Original 
Documents of the Historikerstreit, the Controversy Concerning the Singularity of the Holocaust, trans. 
James Knowlton and Truett Cates (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1993), 27. 
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called the “solidarity of silence.”3  In order to create and continue with a normal life, the 
parents from the Nazi generation established a status quo of muteness in which their 
children often felt stifled.  In the classroom and in the public arena, the Nachkriegskinder 
were linked to the Nazi past through education and reparations, but the connection was 
lost or denied at home.  Their identity and their roots as Germans were missing.  “The 
facts about the Third Reich, which were transmitted in their school or in the media, could 
not provide them with the knowledge of their own roots since, as a closed topic in their 
own families, the subject found no personal echo.”4  The confusion created by this 
discontinuity led quite often to frustration that eventually found an outlet in accusation 
and political demonstration.  The distance between them and their parents’ generation the 
Nachkriegskinder expanded with their activism, with many of them joining the New Left 
or opposition groups dedicated to fighting the fascism they believed was continuing to 
control Germany secretly.   
 The New Left and the philosophers of the Frankfurt School influenced these 
young radicals of 1960s’ Germany.  Students and street-fighters mobilized in an 
impassioned protest against what they saw as the continuity between the Third Reich and 
the Federal Republic of Germany.  Freedom-revoking legislation, the Vietnam War, and 
conflict in the Middle East spawned a number of demonstrations across West Germany, 
sparking violence between the state and its youth in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
                                                
3 Margarete Hecker, “Family Reconstruction in Germany: An Attempt to Confront the Past,” in The 
Collective Silence: German Identity and the Legacy of Shame, ed. Barbara Heimannsberg and Christoph J. 
Schmidt, trans. Cynthia Oudejans Harris and Gordon Wheeler (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993), 75. 
4 Ibid., 90. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
OVERCOMING A SILENCE: THE CONTINUITY OF THE THIRD REICH AND THE 
PROTEST OF THE 68ERS 
 
 
 Student protestors and street-fighters saw a terrible continuity in the 1960s 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Third Reich.  Fascism was perhaps 
their most important and their most pervasive enemy in the eyes of the 68ers of the 
Nachkriegsgeneration.  The German New Left’s definition of fascism made it a reaction 
of capitalist economies.  Therefore, many influential intellectuals of West Germany did 
not see the Federal Republic’s democratic capitalism as a break from fascism.  They also 
called the policies of the new democracy authoritarian when they outlawed communist 
political parties and passed the Notstandgesetzte (Emergency Laws), which were 
designed to suspend freedoms in times of national emergency.  The Notstandgesetzte, 
especially, appeared to be a frightening reminder of Nazism when intellectuals and 
student protestors pointed to the emergency measure that placed Hitler in power in 1933. 
Nazis Still in Power 
 It was not government policy alone that reminded the Nachkriegskinder of 
National Socialism; several politicians and government officials were former members of 
the NSDAP.5  In January of 1960, Time Magazine published an article about Nazis in 
West German government positions.  Time reported that one out of every three West 
German members of parliament was a former Nazi along with approximately half of all 
senior civil servants.  Eight Federal Republic ambassadors in 1960 were former Nazi 
                                                
5 Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei, the National Socialist German Workers Party. 
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party members.6  By 1965, sixty percent of West Germany’s military officers had fought 
for the Third Reich while two-thirds of the judges had served under the Nazi regime.7  It 
was not limited to civil servants and judges; there were also a number of highly visible 
public officials who were former Nazis.   
 Hans Krüger participated in the failed Beer Hall Putsch in 1923 and later worked 
as a Nazi judge in Konitz (now in northern Poland).  He served as an officer in the 
Wehrmacht8 from 1943 to 1945.  After World War II, he joined the Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU)9 and was a member of the Bundestag (parliament) from 1957 to 1965.  
Krüger also served a term as Minister for Expellees, Refugees, and War Claimants in 
1963 but lost this position because of his suspected involvement in war crimes.  
According to Yad Vashem, Krüger was an SS-Captain in charge of the mass murder 
operations in Stanislawow in southeastern Galicia carried out by the Grenzpolizei-
Kommissariat (Border Police).10  A court, however, denied that there was evidence to 
support his guilt. 
 Theodor Oberländer joined the NSDAP in 1933, became a professor at Ernst 
Moritz Arndt University, and worked actively to make it judenfrei (Jew-free).  After the 
Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, he served on the eastern front as an officer with the 
Nightingale Battalion in Lvov in 1941 where he conducted anti-partisan warfare.  After 
the war, he became a member of Konrad Adenauer’s government in 1953 and joined the 
                                                
6 “The Haunted Past,” Time Magazine, 25 January 1960.  Database online.  http://www.time.com/time/ 
magazine/archives, s.v. “Theodor Oberlaender;” accessed 9 May 2007. 
7 Jeremy Varon, Bringing the War Home: the Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and 
Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 2004), 33. 
8 The National Socialist military. 
9 The CDU is a conservative political party. 
10 Dieter Pohl, “Hans Krueger and the Murder of the Jews in the Stanislawow Region (Galicia).” Yad 
Vashem.  Available from http://www.yadvashem.org, s.v. “Hans Krueger;” accessed 9 May 2007. 
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CDU in 1956.  In January 1960, he appeared before the Hague to deny accuations that he 
had participated in the Lvov Massacre of over 2,000 people.  He claimed the Soviets had 
killed those people before he arrived.  An East German court tried and convicted him in 
absentia for that massacre and sentenced him to life in prison.  Protesting the trial and his 
innocence, Oberländer resigned from the West German government.11 
 Hans Josef Maria Globke was one of the men who had formulated the emergency 
powers act that put Hitler in power in 1933.  He managed to escape the official label of 
Nazi when Martin Bormann denied his application for party membership in 1940 for 
reason of Globke’s past involvement with the Center Party.12  After the war, Globke 
became the national security advisor to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.  But it was one of 
Adenauer’s successors, Kurt Georg Kiesinger who made some of the biggest headlines in 
West Germany in the 1960s.  Kiesinger became the head of the Große Koalition (Great 
Coalition) and Chancellor of West Germany in 1966.  Kiesinger had joined the NSDAP 
in 1933 and worked as a propaganda minister for the Nazis.  After the war, he joined the 
CDU and became a member of parliament in 1949.13  In 1968, after a very public 
confrontation with Kiesinger in West Berlin, Beate Klarsfeld and her husband made it 
their crusade to “out” Kiesinger and others as Nazis.14 
 The issue of the number of Nazis in government positions in the Federal Republic 
began in 1948 when the United States ended the denazification program within its zone 
of occupation.  This meant that a large number of former Nazi party members and other 
                                                
11 “The Haunted Past”, Time Magazine, January 25, 1960.   
12 A Catholic-based, non-fascist political party. 
13 Deutsches Historisches Museum Berlin LeMO: Lebendiges virtuelles Museum Online, “Biographie: Kurt 
Georg Kiesinger, 1904-1988.” Available from http://www.dhm.de/lemo/suche, s.v. “Kiesinger;” accessed 3 
June 2007. 
14 KlarsfeldFoundation.org, “An Introduction.”  Available from http://www.klarsfeldfoundation.org; 
accessed 28 May 2007. 
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participants in the regime were able to reenter society without much effort.  More than a 
few entered politics and by 1968, Kurt Georg Kiesinger and Heinrich Lübke, both former 
members of the NSDAP, held two of the highest offices in West Germany: Chancellor 
and President, respectively.15  It was quite common, especially under Konrad Adenauer’s 
administration, to find a number of former Nazis (both “denazified” and otherwise) 
holding key government positions.  The philosopher Karl Jaspers blamed the Western 
Allies for this, writing in 1966 that the old-line politicians had been forced on the 
Germans out of expediency.16    
Inner Emigration and the Weapon of Nazism 
 Mirroring the politicians in their efforts to forget about the past, the authors of 
postwar Germany called for a Kahlschlag, an attempt to remove the influence of Nazism 
from the German language, and therefore literature.  Some German authors spoke of 
“inner emigration;” this was the process by which artists and writers managed to resist 
the Nazi regime, passively, by keeping themselves removed intellectually.  The 
Kahlschlag, in conjunction with the exoneration from inner emigration, was supposed to 
provide Germany’s postwar authors with a new beginning free of any taint of National 
Socialism.  Thomas Mann, an exiled German author, criticized inner emigration17 and 
later, the authors of the 1960s exposed this Kahlschlag as ineffective.  Meanwhile, most 
of the immediate postwar literature dealt with the war and Nazism in purely abstract, 
even allegorical, terms.18  It was the female authors such as Elisabeth Langgässer (Das 
unauslöschliche Siegel, 1946) who addressed the National Socialist period, the war, and 
                                                
15 Rob Burns, ed., German Cultural Studies: an introduction (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 213. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 223. 
18 Ibid., 223-224. 
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the issues arising out of both directly.  These female authors, largely ignored until the 
mid to late 1960s, wrote about all the issues the 68ers wanted their history to address, 
such as “daily life under fascism, resistance efforts, the civilian war experience, the 
persecution of the Jews, and concentration camps.”19  But such works, by and large, did 
not reach West German students until the issue of women’s rights was raised and 
seriously considered in the 1960s.  “The widespread resistance to women’s participation 
in cultural and intellectual life was reflected in a survey of faculty members at West 
German universities in 1960, which found that 64 per cent of respondents were opposed 
to allowing women even to attend university, 4 per cent were neutral on the subject, and 
32 per cent stood somewhere between neutrality and opposition; in addition 79 per cent 
objected to the idea of hiring women at lecturer level or above.”20  This discrimination in 
higher education would not begin to break down until the student activists forced the 
issue by introducing gender politics into the national debate.  Women authors and their 
treatment of the National Socialist past would have to be forced upon universities which 
were still bastions of male dominance; and this in a country that was actively and legally 
encouraging, even forcing women to be housewives and mothers.  Begun in the Adenauer 
administration, the government of the Federal Republic provided National Socialist-like 
incentives to women and families to have many children by giving Kindergeld 
(government assistance) to the family for every child produced after the second one.21  
Led by conservative politicians and church leaders, the Federal Republic promoted 
extremely traditional sexual and family values. 
                                                
19 Ibid., 228. 
20 Ibid., 230. 
21 Ibid., 216. 
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   According to many of the Christian leaders in postwar Germany, the primary 
moral issue facing the German people in the 1950s was sexuality, rather than as Lothar 
Kreyssig22 believed, the guilt for Nazi crimes.  A result of this emphasis on sexual 
morality made sexuality and sexual freedom an important issue for the Nachkriegskinder, 
and the 68ers melded this with images of the Holocaust to use in their attack on the 
institutions of power.  Their mixing of Holocaust study with sexual issues was not purely 
academic, however. The term Nazi had become a harsh way to denounce an opponent 
and mixing metaphors of genocide with gender and sexual issues created a hyperbole to 
strengthen the argument in favor of sexual and feminist liberation.23  Growing up in the 
repressive 1950s, the Nachkriegskinder were bombarded with the message that “the 
Nazis themselves encouraged promiscuity and illegitimacy and that their sexual 
immorality was inseparable from their other crimes.”24  To make their argument, 
however, New Leftists reversed this and argued that the Nazis were sexually repressed 
which led to them to commit mass murder and other atrocities.  Certainly there was a 
strong element of male chauvinism permeating National Socialism, but the cause and 
effect between sexual repression and genocide would remain theoretical.  
 The parents’ generation repeatedly brought up such terms as Nazi and Nazism in 
the postwar years, but not in an effort to analyze guilt issues.  These terms were used as 
buzzwords in discussions of sex to invoke an immediate response of revulsion, horror, or 
fear.  They used Nazism as a sexual morality lesson.  The war generation were not 
                                                
22 Kreyssig was the founder of Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste, a non-profit charitable organization 
dedicated to physically and psychologically rebuilding Germany’s relationship with the victims of the 
Third Reich. 
23 Dagmar Herzog, “’Pleasure, Sex, and Politics Belong Together’: Post-Holocaust Memory and the Sexual 
Revolution in West Germany,” Critical Inquiry 24, no. 2, Intimacy (Winter 1998): 397-398.  Database 
online.  http://www.jstor.org, s.v. “68ers;” accessed 8 May 2007. 
24 Ibid., 397. 
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dealing with the past, they were using a terrible thing from their past to scare their 
children into behaving in an acceptable way; and thus, in the 1950s’ arguments about 
sexuality, Nazism was used as a scare tactic.  In so doing, the parents were still avoiding 
the issue of their generation’s crimes.  Instead, the Third Reich had become a morality 
play where the decadent Nazis were outlasted by the abstemious good Germans and 
abstinence became the definition of the non-Nazi in the 1950s in West Germany.  The 
68ers fought against this repressive definition by, ironically, using the same weapon as 
their parents.  The accusation of Nazism was to remain a political, social, or moral 
weapon.25 
Sexuality and Hypocrisy 
 The 68ers, in a bid to further a sexual revolution, latched on to the psychological 
studies of Erich Fromm, Alexander Mitscherlich, and Reinhart Westphal.  The students 
read scholarship that proposed sexual repression led to an increase in aggression which, if 
not released in a healthy fashion, would lead to murder as an extreme result.  One 
philosophy PhD, Arno Plack, used the Auschwitz Trials of the early 1960s as fodder for 
his research into this issue in 1967.  His study was concerned not only with the SS 
officers on trial, but also with the lack of popular public support for those trials by some 
members of the German population; specifically, “older members of society [who] called 
loudly for the punishment of rapists and murderers but [who] were disinclined to support 
the Auschwitz Trials.”26  Puzzled over the lack of positive response from some members 
of the war generation, Plack sought an explanation and proposed that “the liberties taken 
                                                
25 Ulrich Schlie, “Today’s View of the Third Reich and the Second World War in German 
Historiographical Discourse,” The Historical Journal 43, no. 2 (June 2000): 543-545.  Database online.  
http://www.jstor.org, s.v. “Historikerstreit Vergangenheitsbewältigung;” accessed 23 September 2006. 
26 Herzog, “’Pleasure, Sex, and Politics,’” 403. 
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by individual criminals bothered people, but murderers in uniform were an object of 
identification.”27  Plack’s work in 1967 strove to analyze the causes of fascism and 
violence by studying not only the perpetrators but also those in his society who were 
bystanders and their motives for supporting or not supporting the punishment of the war 
criminals.  Plack’s work, specifically, also begged the question: how could someone 
seem to be so respectable in one moment only to become a sadistic monster the next?  
“As one member after another of the generation of 1968 would later testify, the similarity 
between the code of good behavior postwar society demanded of them and the model of 
behavior evidently exemplified by the executors of genocide, sickened them deeply.”28  
The people who, when not guarding concentration camps or participating in extreme 
violence on the front lines, were perfectly behaved and respectable bourgeois types, 
became even more horrific and monstrous after the revelation of the banality of evil29, as 
Hannah Arendt wrote.  The Nachkriegskinder were forced to look at their own parents 
and wonder what they had done during the war, especially those with fathers who had 
returned from POW camps.  They were torn between defending their parents (my father 
was a Nazi but he did not do those things) and accusing them to rid themselves of that 
burden of guilt (my father may have killed a Jew but it has nothing to do with me).   
 The 68ers took this in a different direction, demanding an accounting from an 
entire generation.  But, such realizations were deeply shocking for the Nachkriegskinder 
precisely for the reason that it was about their parents.  This was not knowledge learned 
at home over the course of years but sickening realizations forced by the socio-political 
                                                
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 The Banality of Evil was the title of Hannah Arendt’s book based on her interviews with Adolf Eichmann 
(a Nazi bureaucrat in charge of the Final Solution) and her coverage of his 1961 trial for crimes against 
humanity. 
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climate of the time.  This caused some to fight harder against the bourgeois morality of 
their parents which they saw as inherently hypocritical.  “Above all, they had a handle on 
what came to seem like one of the greatest hypocrisies of postwar society, in Plack’s 
words, ‘the secret agreement of the society, that provides cover for the concentration 
camp murderer, but at the same time for example denounces the parents of a bride for the 
crime of pimping, if they allow the future son-in-law to spend the night.’”30  The psycho-
analyzation of the sexual causes behind fascism was a useful weapon to counter the 
previous generation’s use of Nazism as a sexual morality weapon.  According to the 
thinking of such activists as those in Kommune 1,31 anti-authoritarian behavior and 
sexual liberation, as the exact opposite of what the Nazi generation advocated both during 
the regime and in the democracy afterwards, was the answer.  The news magazine, Der 
Spiegel, provided support for this in 1967 when it drew correlations between statements 
made by church fathers on sexual morality in the postwar years and Hitler’s call to 
eliminate elements of provocativeness and eroticism in German culture in his book, Mein 
Kampf.32  Of course, in the interest of simplicity, these studies and articles ignored the 
ambiguous aspect of the relationship between the Nazis and sexuality. 
 In conjunction with these confrontations with the bourgeois morality of their 
parents, the 68ers and their psychologists framed an attack on the Christian Church of 
Germany as well.  The Church, an obvious target in their conflict with antiquated 
morality, also represented a center of hypocrisy when it came to the crimes of the Third 
Reich.  The proponents of sexual liberation took the opportunity to uncover the Church’s 
                                                
30 Herzog, “’Pleasure, Sex, and Politics,’” 403. 
31 A commune established by such leftist activists as Rudi Dutschke, an influential member of several 
leftist activist organizations. 
32 Herzog, “’Pleasure, Sex, and Politics,’” 406. 
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prior position in favor of National Socialism.  One author popular with the 68ers, 
Karlheinz Deschner, in his book The Cross of the Church: A Sexual History of 
Christianity, quoted statements made by church leaders who supported the attacks on 
sexual immorality made by the Nazi regime.  Deschner criticized the unerring stance of 
Christianity on sexual morality that gave the impression that sexual promiscuity was a 
greater sin than murder.  He attacked Rome for its preoccupation with sex rather than 
denouncing the slaughter of millions in the camps.33 
 The churches in postwar Germany were preoccupied with the sexual decency of 
the German people, drawing lessons for the public between National Socialist atheism 
and sexual explicitness to the regime’s evil and downfall.  Neither the destruction of 
Europe’s Jews nor the slaughter of millions of people was a part of the churches’ 
argument.  While the religious conservatives manipulated the imagery of Nazi violence to 
enforce traditional morality, the psychoanalysis of the Nazi regime favored by the 68ers 
married the twin issues of sex and violence and presented a correlation the churches and 
the CDU refused to address.  The 68ers pointed not only to the similarities between the 
Christian religion’s encouragement to procreate and the Third Reich’s laws encouraging 
the same thing, but also at historical church support for the regime. 
 A very important aspect of these attacks on repressive sexual morality was the 
fact that the issues of the past were being raised.  For the first time since the fall of the 
Third Reich, “commentators were quite clearly articulating their horror at what they saw 
as the persistence of the Nazi legacy in their present, both as it was directed at children 
and as it was aimed at adults.”34  These commentators not only used National Socialism 
                                                
33 Ibid., 408-409. 
34 Ibid., 410. 
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as a frame for their arguments but also strove to understand the mindset involved in such 
a murderous apparatus as the Third Reich. 
 But how did both sides of the debate use the same example to make their point?  
In postwar Germany the status quo stated that the Nazis were sexually immoral and 
therefore morally bankrupt.  Out of a desire to prove that they were not Nazis, postwar 
Germans dedicated themselves to being the opposite of what they had defined as Nazi, 
which meant for them an emphasis on traditional morality.  Bourgeois sexual and family 
values were a force not only in the home but also in the political arena with the CDU in 
political majority until 1966 when it joined with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) to 
create the Great Coalition that controlled well over half of parliament.  This meant that 
“the perspectives the churches fostered were not only the most widely disseminated ones 
but also the ones that structured criminal and civil law and state family and welfare 
policy.”35  The anti-Nazi sexual mores embraced by the CDU rang false for the 68ers, 
especially when they counted how many former Nazis were active in the conservative 
postwar political parties. 
 Political conservatives, sociologists, and religious leaders not only used the taint 
of National Socialism as a strategy but also employed the image of genocide as a tactic to 
eliminate support for abortion.  Dr. Hermann Frühauf was a Catholic doctor who wrote 
“Paragraph 218” in 1946 in which he equated abortion with Auschwitz.  Part of the 
doctor’s agenda was to encourage the birthrate after what was the most destructive and 
deadliest war in history, but the use of such a shocking hyperbole was also a moral tactic.  
For Frühauf and his supporters, anyone who supported abortion, “whether he intends this 
or not; whether he understands this or not, serves those forces and powers, that trespass 
                                                
35 Ibid., 411. 
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against humanity; he finds himself at a particularly dangerous point on that precipitous 
slope, that in its last consequences leads to the gas chambers of some Auschwitz.”36  The 
issue of abortion was an extremely delicate subject in Germany in the mid 1960s with 
many politicians refusing to discuss it.  The very idea of abortion reminded many, in a 
highly uncomfortable way, of the Nazi T-4 euthanasia and forced sterilization programs.  
For many West Germans, abortion was not an issue of women’s reproductive rights but 
something too steeped in negative eugenics to be considered.37  The use of Auschwitz, 
the Nazis, and genocide by political and religious conservatives as political and moral 
tools to mold the public mind stimulated very little argument or outcry until the 68ers 
countered by pointing out the National Socialist roots of those who made the argument. 
Generational Guilt and the Burden of the Past 
 The 68ers, in actions ironically similar to that of their parents in the postwar era, 
strove to be the opposite of everything the Nazis represented to them and the underlying 
conflict between the two generations existed over what the Nazi generation termed the 
“guilt obsession.”  Some members of the Nachkriegsgeneration (postwar generation), to 
counter the attitudes of their parents, turned to anti-authoritarian student revolts in order 
to confront the guilt their parents seemed determined to ignore.  In the 1960s, children of 
the Nazi generation had reached an age where they not only asked questions, but 
demanded answers.38 
 Lothar Baier wrote in Die Zeit in 1987: 
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For all the self-righteousness and occasional hysteria that 
accompanied the outbreak of recuperated antifascism, it 
must be admitted that it marked a caesura in West German 
postwar history: for the first time, German society in the 
FRG39 was compelled from within to confront, politically, 
morally, and theoretically, its National Socialist antecedent.  
For the first time, the perpetrators who had reached the age 
of retirement unpunished found themselves facing the 
demand for an explanation, not from foreigners but from 
their own children, students, and subordinates.  Even 
lawmakers had to tow the line and, after a period of 
hesitation, exclude Nazi crimes from the statue of 
limitations.40 
 
That is the difference between the 1950s and 1960s, the accusations came from home.  It 
is easier to deny or put aside guilt when it is an outsider placing the blame.  The German 
people dealt with the issue of guilt on the surface of their society when it was required by 
external forces; whether by building memorials or attending trials or paying reparations.  
But that was imposed guilt.  As the Nachkriegskinder reached adulthood, they began to 
demand personal accountings from the previous generation, making the collective guilt 
personal and national rather than a burden imposed by external forces.  For the first time 
since the end of the war, serious accusations were coming from among the Germans 
themselves.  
  During the process of denazification, there were a considerable number of 
accusations, but they were based on the guilt of being a National Socialist party member 
and not the atrocities of Hitler’s war against the Jews.  Denazification differed from the 
indictments of the 68ers in that the German accusers from the war generation expected an 
outside authority to resolve the issue for them.  At surrender, the Nazis became the 
responsibility of the occupiers, removing the burden for the regime and the responsibility 
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for punishing its proponents from the Germans.  After denazification ended in the 
American zone in 1948, the Germans prospered under a blanket of approval for having 
completed the program.  1950s’ West Germany was characterized by appropriate public 
contrition, philo-Semitism, and philo-Zionism. The issue of hidden Nazis was not 
addressed again until the 1960s.  Germany had been denazified and the German people 
considered themselves clean.  The Nachkriegskinder, however, growing up in a 
struggling democracy weighed down by a fear of communist oppression believed to be 
surrounding the nation, accused their parents and their government of avoiding the issue.  
As one historian put it, “Hating communism meant one thing: marginalizing the 
Holocaust and rebuilding a new Germany.”41   
 Some young Germans even made attempts to atone for the sins of their parents by 
joining Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste.  The ASF was founded by an anti-Nazi 
German minister named Lothar Kreyssig.  After the end of the Second World War, 
Kreyssig believed the Christians of Germany had betrayed their ideals and beliefs by 
supporting the Third Reich and participating in the Holocaust.  In the 1950s, Kreyssig 
preached atonement for Germany’s sins.  “We Germans began World War II and by this 
alone, more than others, we are guilty of bringing immeasurable suffering to humankind.  
We ask the peoples who suffered violence at our hands to allow us to perform a good 
deed in their countries with our hands and resources…as a sign of atonement.”42  
Kreyssig’s organization brought young Germans into contact with the victims of National 
Socialism in an effort to promote healing.  Young adults would travel to war-torn areas to 
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rebuild cities and in 1961, were invited to Israel for the first time to work on collective 
farms.  The young Germans who participated in the ASF had taken their parents’ guilt 
onto themselves out of a need to expunge what they saw as Germany’s guilt and their 
guilt as Germans.  In contrast, the protest of the student activists was based on the guilt of 
others, which they saw as divorced from themselves. 
 In order to study how Germans bore guilt, a survey was conducted in West 
Germany in 1961 to gauge people’s responses to the trial of Adolf Eichmann.  It 
produced intriguing results:  67% of West Germans believed Eichmann should either be 
sentenced to death or life with hard labor.  This particular survey also included lists of 
statements with which the participants could agree or disagree:  59% agreed and 28% 
disagreed with the statement, “I personally had nothing to do with it [the Holocaust] and 
don’t want to hear anything more about it.”  Likewise, 53% agreed and 33% disagreed 
with the statement, “it would be best to forget about this affair and to concern ourselves 
exclusively with the present and future.”  Seventy-two percent of the population of the 
Federal Republic in 1961 believed most Germans in the 1940s knew what the Nazis were 
doing to the Jews, but 88% denied feeling any guilt for the Holocaust.43  Yet, while the 
West German population appeared to be unconcerned with the past, the percentage of 
those who believed Germany was solely responsible for WWII rose from 32% in 1951 to 
62% in 1967.44  Up to the late 1960s, more and more West Germans believed that their 
world image was tied to Nazism.  In 1955 only 13% believed Germans were 
internationally “unloved,” whereas 38% believed it in 1969.  Also, the number of 
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Germans in the Federal Republic who desired a cutoff point with their past (Schlussstrich 
ziehen—literally, drawing an end-line) nearly doubled from 34% in 1958 to 67% in 
1969.45   
 In 1970, a series of interviews with over fifty citizens of Heidelberg in West 
Germany was published.  The interviewees ranged from high school students to Catholic 
priests, college students, and one seventy-year-old former soldier.  In one interview with 
two teenage boys, the deficiency of Heidelberg’s education of its students on National 
Socialism and the Third Reich becomes clear.  One boy complained that he had not been 
taught anything about that period of his nation’s history while the other boy explained 
that he was being taught quite a lot about it.  This, however, he attributed to having a 
young teacher who showed “movies of the Third Reich and [told the students] what 
different people had to say about them [the films], Jews and so on, people who were 
interviewed after they’d seen them.”46  Apparently this teacher was interested in giving 
his students a fairly comprehensive lesson about the Nazis; the student explained that his 
class had, chronologically, just reached Hitler’s seizure of power in their studies.  
Another high school student described a similar experience at her school.  She explained 
that her teacher “attached great importance to it [learning about National Socialism].”47  
Of course, both teachers were fairly young, probably in the same age range as most of the 
68ers.   
 The conflict begun by the 1960s’young adults demanding an open dialogue with 
the past filtered down into the high schools.  However, many West Germans, including 
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some of these young adults, desired a break with the past, a drawing line where they 
could stop discussing the Third Reich.  A twenty-year-old college student explained that 
she was exposed to education about the Nazis quite frequently, but described a sterile 
atmosphere.  “When, for example, someone delivered a report about the concentration 
camps or about the Jewish question, no one was allowed to express any opinion.”48  She 
complained that people were tired of talking about it. In fact, a number of people 
interviewed both denounced the rise of neo-fascism (in the guise of the NPD)49 and then 
deplored being made to suffer a burden of guilt.  One twenty-seven-year-old college 
student blamed his parents for being too submissive to the Nazis and thereby allowing the 
atrocities to happen, but later declared that Germans had dwelt too long on the past.  He 
complained of what he called “this eternal breast-beating.”50  There was a strange 
dichotomy between wanting to learn more about the National Socialist period and yet 
wanting to talk about it less.  One sixty-four-year-old professor of law observed the 
change in how his college students related to Germany’s National Socialist past and what 
their views were at the time of the interview in the late 1960s: 
Immediately after the War our typical student was only 
relatively intelligent but always conscientious….  He 
regarded the National Socialist period as a historical fact 
that lay behind him, for which perhaps our fathers were 
responsible but to which he himself had not been 
committed.  He studied, he tried to secure a successful 
future by getting good marks in his courses and 
examinations.  It was only around 1960 that a change 
occurred and now the National Socialist period is again 
becoming a burning issue.  Now incisive questions are 
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raised: “What actually happened?  How did people 
behave?”  I regard this as a very good sign.51 
 
However, this interest seemed to be concentrated in predominantly universities with the 
majority of West Germans either unconcerned with or apathetic about their own history.  
This issue of apathy came from a sense of bearing a burden they did not own.  Most 
young West Germans felt disconnected from a National Socialist past that they saw as 
unfairly dominating their present.  The law professor explained that many of his students 
disagreed with continued reparations payments to Israel and were tired of carrying around 
eternal guilt.52  While some members of the Nachkriegsgeneration wished, like many of 
their parents, to leave the past behind, the 68ers pressed forward with their confrontation.  
The locus of this move to address the National Socialist past originally lay in West Berlin 
with the student activists of the New Left who strove to unearth corruption in their 
government and change their society. 
Intellectuals and the Student Protestors 
 The students who made up a large part of the protest movements in West 
Germany in the 1960s were leftists opposed to the materialism of capitalism as well as 
the allegedly imperialist policies of capitalist nations such as the United States.  They 
feared increasing authoritarianism that appeared to be taking over the government of the 
Federal Republic.  The Great Coalition of the Christian Democrats and the Social 
Democrats in November 1966 gave the new organization ninety percent of the seats in 
the Bundestag53 and was led by Kurt Georg Kiesinger, a former National Socialist.  With 
the governing coalition very close to holding complete control over parliament, many 
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student activists joined the so-called Außerparlamentarische Opposition54 (APO) in an 
attempt to establish a political counterweight to the Great Coalition.  Of course, such 
seemingly authoritarian measures as the Notstandgesetzte were immediately denounced 
by the protestors as “Nazi”.  The National Socialist past permeated the 1960s’ Federal 
Republic during the student protests, partly for the authoritarian measures proposed by 
the West German government and partly for the number of former Nazis not only left 
over from Adenauer’s government, but those who (like Kiesinger) were quickly rising to 
greater power in the new democratic government.  To the 68ers, already alienated from 
silent parents unwilling to discuss their Nazi past, all of this seemed hypocritical and 
undemocratic.  And to make matters worse, one of the largest publishing concerns in 
West Germany, Springer Verlag, was obviously biased against the students.  Axel 
Springer’s newspapers regularly indulged in yellow journalism, denouncing the 
protestors and labeling their leaders (like Rudi Dutschke) communists, something that 
was a highly sensitive subject especially in the “island” of West Berlin. 
 Fear of communism was a thread that ran through West Germany, and especially 
West Berlin.  But starting in the 1960s with students and others protesting against the 
government, these became areas fearful of the words Nazi and fascist as well.  These 
became words of denouncement, and for the left-wing activists, words of political and 
social anathema.  It seemed that everywhere one looked in local or national government 
there were former Nazis, deemed successfully denazified by the occupation powers, and 
others who managed to escape denouncement altogether until exposed by the 68ers. 
 West Berlin was an area extremely politically sensitive.  The students, centered 
mainly in the Free University of Berlin, initially sought a change in their traditional 
                                                
54 The Extra-Parliamentary Opposition. 
 27
universities’ structures and policies, things they saw as confining and outdated.  The Free 
University was itself established as a protest to the communist dominated Humboldt 
University in the Soviet controlled sector of Berlin in 1948.  Called the “Berlin Model”, 
this new university was established on a principle of participation by students and 
cooperation between students and faculty.55  The students of the Free University of Berlin 
were introduced to a more democratic system that encouraged the students to speak their 
minds in open forums.  But by 1960, even this open and democratic institution was 
falling back on older, more authoritarian ways when it seemed that fewer and fewer 
students were interested in participating in politics.  The administration and faculty seized 
the opportunity to regain and monopolize control of the university.  The “Berlin Model” 
of an open and fully democratic university had failed and because of this, up and coming 
student leaders felt frustrated and betrayed by the one system in which they should have 
had full participation.56 
 As in the United States and France in the 1960s, anti-government protest 
movements often sprang from the fertile soils of universities.  West German student 
leaders often became politically active since there were many university and student 
organizations affiliated with political parties; organizations such as the Ring Christlich-
Demokratischer Studenten (RCDS) which was an affiliate of the CDU, or the 
Sozialdemokratischer Hochschulbund (SHB) which was affiliated with the Social 
Democrats.57  However, it was a non-affiliated group, the Sozialistischer Deutscher 
Studentenbund (SDS),58 that was often in the middle of or behind many of the protests.  
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The SDS began, like the SHB, as a student affiliate of the Social Democratic Party, but 
the relationship soured in 1959 when the political party officially renounced Marxism and 
began to move more center than left.  The SDS continued in what the Social Democrats 
considered to be too radically leftist a direction.59  The most outspoken ideologue of the 
SDS, Rudi Dutschke, stressed the use of open confrontation with not only the university 
but the government as well.  Eventually calling more and more for violence, Dutschke 
explained that his fellow students would, “through systematic, controlled and limited 
confrontations with the power structure and imperialism in West Berlin…force the 
representative ‘democracy’ to show openly its class character, its authoritarian nature 
[and] force it to expose itself as a ‘dictatorship of force.’”60  Another irony of the 68ers 
lay in Dutschke’s campaign for violence against the state: his were the same words and 
the same tactics used by the National Socialists in the early 1930s when they took 
advantage of the democracy of the Weimar Republic and destroyed it.  This would not be 
the last irony, since a number of 68ers would also turn to violent anti-Semitism.   
 Influenced greatly by Herbert Marcuse (Critique of Pure Tolerance) and Frantz 
Fanon (The Wretched of the Earth), both left-wing intellectuals who advocated that the 
oppressed use violence to overthrow their oppressors, Dutschke and others (following the 
examples of such left-wing revolutionaries as Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara) resorted 
to direct action against those they deemed to be their oppressors.61  It was no surprise 
then that Dutschke’s followers demonstrated in front of the publishing houses of his 
nemesis, Axel Springer, after the student leader was shot in April 1968.   
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 Dutschke and the other student activists were also strongly influenced by the 
social and philosophical theories of the Frankfurt School of Social Research.  The 
foundation of the student protest movement in West Germany in the 1960s was a 
seemingly generalized anti-authoritarianism, described by activist Rudi Dutschke: 
“Today no abstract theory holds us together; instead, it is the existential disgust with a 
society which chatters about freedom while subtly and brutally oppressing the immediate 
interests and needs of individuals and the people fighting for their socio-economic 
emancipation.”62  Dutschke, and other members of the SDS, did absorb the theories of the 
Frankfurt School, however.  The Frankfurt School of Social Research produced the 
Critical Theory, developed by Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer.  Another 
influential member of the school, Jürgen Habermas, was a student of Adorno and 
Horkheimer.  Habermas, in a 1977 interview, described his shock as a young college 
student when he discovered that some of the most influential men of postwar Germany 
had been Nazi supporters, “eminent men like Martin Heidegger and Carl Schmitt.”  Both 
men had delivered statements in support of the National Socialist regime.  “The first 
[Heidegger], as chancellor of the University of Freiburg, had welcomed the Nazis’ 
seizure of power and exalted its significance metaphysically, while the second [Schmitt] 
had theoretically vindicated that state which Hitler created.”63  But, perhaps the worst 
crime was the fact that neither ever retracted those statements nor did they provide any 
explanation for offering support to a criminal regime. 
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 The Critical Theory, asserted by 1960s’ West German intellectuals, was 
concerned with Marxism and its supposed decline and with totalitarianism as evidenced 
not only by the Third Reich but by the postwar Western societies as well.  Horkheimer 
wrote in the Critical Theory in the 1960s: “The Third Reich of which I am conscious 
each waking hour of that part of my life which escaped it, historically was no absurdity, 
but instead a signal of the totalitarianism which appears to be more and more timely even 
on this side of the Iron Curtain.”64  The Frankfurt School framed its Critical Theory in the 
Dialectic of the Enlightenment, also written by Adorno and Horkheimer.  The Dialectic 
of the Enlightenment, in contrast to popular historical theory of the time that claimed that 
the Third Reich was an inevitability that grew out of a thread of barbarity underlying 
German history, proposed instead that the Third Reich was the natural outgrowth of the 
“mathematical formalism” of the Enlightenment.  Adorno and Horkheimer defined the 
Enlightenment as “the reduction of the total universe to the mere stuff for domination by 
man, himself conceived as an abstract, immaterial identity of pure thought.”65  Therefore, 
any society which participated in the Enlightenment or attempted to socially engineer a 
utopia would experience an inevitable progression toward totalitarianism, the prime 
example being the Third Reich of Germany. 
 The Frankfurt School was very influential in forming the sociological base of 
such student groups as the SDS.  Horkheimer, Adorno, and Habermas, as Marxist 
sociologists, believed that West Germany was in danger of succumbing to the 
Kulturindustrie (culture industry) of the United States and was becoming an autoritärer 
Staat (authoritarian state).  The Frankfurt School’s philosophy was anti-capitalist and 
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stated that “the individual in a capitalist society [is] a subconsciously ‘uniformed’ mass-
man, lacking autonomy and thus capable of authoritarian surrender to powers which 
require large numbers of consumers.”66  The Frankfurt School believed that materialism 
forced on the individual would turn him into a consumerist slave ignorant of not only his 
enslavement but also of the actions of his government. 
 Ethically and morally speaking, Habermas believed that the Germans could not 
legitimately embrace their new democracy (and perhaps did not deserve it) because they 
did nothing to rid themselves of the totalitarianism of the Third Reich.  National 
Socialism was taken from the Germans; they did not give it up.  And because there was 
no “explosive act,” no “spontaneous sweeping away”, everything in Germany was tainted 
with Nazism.67  Because of this, the parents’ generation did not deserve the new 
democracy and was not actually creating one.  At no time did they fight against the 
criminal regime; therefore, so many elements of that criminal regime permeated the so-
called new Germany.  This was the legacy handed down to the Nachkriegsgeneration, 
that of a tainted society.  This was part of what the students believed they were struggling 
against, what was taught to them by the Frankfurt School.  The post-war generation 
believed they were being forced to suffer the crimes to which their parents would not 
admit. 
 From the Dialectic of the Enlightenment and the Critical Theory, the students 
learned to relate everything to their nation’s National Socialist past.  The Third Reich 
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permeated nearly every aspect of their lives from their parents to their professors to their 
politicians.  The intellectuals of the Frankfurt School and authors such as Günter Grass 
and Heinrich Böll taught them that the National Socialist past was not something that 
could or should be ignored.  If their protests were to be successful, they had to uncover 
the past and make sure it was no longer neglected. 
Authorship and the New Left 
 German authors, most notably Günter Grass and Heinrich Böll, began to publish 
works that dealt with the issue of National Socialism beginning in 1959 and 1960.  
Breaking away from the failed literary experiment of Kahlschlag and inner emigration, 
these new works “offered a critical, essentially historical view of National Socialism 
located within the wider spectrum of German militarism in the twentieth century.”  Böll’s 
1963 work, Ansichten eines Clowns, set the stage for the 68ers’ criticism of Nazis in their 
democratic government by illustrating the ease with which former Nazis regained 
affluence and influence in the new government and how they had retained aspects of 
National Socialism.68  In the early 1960s, two major events took place that most likely 
affected the choice of subject: the highly publicized arrest and trial of Adolf Eichmann 
and the series of Auschwitz Trials.  The Nazis were once again center stage and 
impossible to ignore.  German theater especially reflected this influence by breaking 
away from the collective silence and producing a series of documentary dramas centered 
on National Socialism, inspired by the Auschwitz Trials.69  Such social commentary 
came from a variety of areas and addressed a range of topics, none more controversial 
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than the proposed Notstandgesetzte.  In 1966, Karl Jaspers published Wohin treibt die 
Bundesrepublik?  In this work, the philosopher called for an examination of the oligarchy 
he believed to be dominating West German politics.  He then proposed that if continued 
unchecked, such an oligarchy could become a dictatorship and the Notstandgesetzte 
(Emergency Laws) were a step in the same process that put the Nazis in total power in 
1933.70  Student activists seized on this logic and a demonstration of approximately 
20,000 strong marched in Frankfurt in October 1966 in protest against the 
Notstandgesetzte.  Many of the activists who marched against these Emergency Laws 
were members of the German New Left. 
 The Neue Linke (New Left) was created by intellectuals, such as those of the 
Frankfurt School, and radicals who disagreed with communism, sparked in part by the 
violent policies of the Soviet Union with such countries as Hungary during its revolt in 
1956.  The New Left also broke away when many of the groups of the old Left renounced 
Marxism in 1959.  Intellectuals like Herbert Marcuse believed that because the people of 
the working class were under the spell of capitalism, they had become, as the Frankfurt 
School believed, “mass-men.” The New Left believed that the working class was 
mesmerized, made passive by material abundance and consumer goods and therefore 
incapable of breaking free on its own.  The working class would not be able to free itself 
without such intellectuals and radicals as those of the New Left to break the chains, 
without whom there would be no proletariat uprising.  The New Left also accused the old 
Left of hidden authoritarianism and manipulating public opinion.  This resounded with 
students who experienced comparable situations in their universities and began to believe 
that their government was not committed to the democracy it claimed to have 
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established.71  For some of these students, the only way to affect the situation was no 
longer through petitions and open forums, not when university rectors continuously 
overturned any reforms agreed upon.  The student New Left decided, instead, on a course 
of Subversive Aktion (Subversive Action).  The intention of Subversive Action, according 
to member Rudi Dutschke, was to uncover hidden power structures in their society 
through protests, demonstrations, and other planned situations; these would provoke a 
violent, repressive response from the government and would thereby reveal the true 
fascist nature of the regime.72 
 Dutschke, also a member of the SDS, participated in many protests and gave 
many speeches in which he outlined the students’ goals.  “As early as their statement of 
‘The University in a Democratic Society’ in 1961 the SDS had advocated a university 
that would train them to think critically and to act politically, which would result in more 
democracy at the university and in the society.”73  These students saw their university as 
a microcosm of their society and a basis for change.  Until 1967, the student movement 
remained small and closely confined to the universities.  In June of 1967, the protests 
against the Shah of Iran, sparked by his visit to Berlin, turned violent.  At the end of May, 
some six thousand students had protested the Shah in Munich without incident, but on 2 
June three thousand Berlin students clashed with police and a twenty-six-year-old student 
named Benno Ohnesorg was shot and killed.  In the following days, nearly one hundred 
thousand students would demonstrate across the Federal Republic in protest against 
police brutality and in support of free speech and democracy.74 
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 A year earlier, the Kuratorium Notstand der Demokratie (Committee Against the 
State of Emergency) was created to oppose nuclear weapons, U.S. actions in Vietnam, 
and the Notstandgesetzte proposed by the West German government (a law that would 
suspend personal freedoms in a time of emergency).  When Ohnesorg was shot, this 
proved to the Kuratorium that “uncontrolled executive power would use violence against 
demonstrations in any future state of emergency.”  Taking advantage of Ohnesorg’s 
death, the Kuratorium distributed leaflets and held lectures that swayed a number of 
university students to oppose the Notstandgesetzte.75  A year after the violence of the 
Shah’s visit, the committee held a protest in Bonn (seat of the Federal Republic’s 
parliament) and approximately 50,000 people demonstrated against the reading of the 
Notstandgesetzte.  The New York Times wrote that the “majority condemned the 
emergency legislation as Nazi.”76  To the students, these laws were dangerously similar 
to those that put Hitler in power in 1933 and revealed the hypocrisy of their government’s 
dedication to democracy.  The only concession gained by the Kuratorium was a slight 
change in the legislation that would decrease the power of the executive branch in the 
enactment of the laws.  Otherwise, the Notstandgesetzte were passed intact on 30 May 
1968. 
The Press and the Protests 
 Another concern for the students was free speech and freedom of press, 
something they saw as monopolized by Springer Verlag, “which controlled 78 percent of 
the daily newspaper and magazine circulation of Berlin and nearly a third in West 
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Germany.”77  Springer newspapers wrote daily against the students and other activists, 
accusing them of being communists and even labeling Rudi Dutschke “Red Rudi.” For 
the students, this was very similar to the Hugenberg-Konzern, the publishing concern of 
industrialist Alfred Hugenberg, who had helped put Hitler in power in the 1930s. The 
accusation of communism also turned the German public strongly against the activists.  
The antagonism between the students and the Springer concern exploded in April 1968 
with the attempted murder of Dutschke by a fascist named Josef Bachmann.  Student 
activists blamed Springer as the mastermind behind the attempt on Dutschke’s life and 
attacked Springer offices across the Federal Republic.  Over the following days of what 
would be called the Easter Riots, thousands of students attacked Springer delivery vans, 
clashed with police, and held protests in cities around West Germany.  These riots were 
the largest expression of student anger and frustration at a supposedly democratic system 
apparently determined to keep them oppressed.  The most obvious reason for this 
oppression was, for the students, the influence of Nazis in an unbalanced government. 
 The political system in West Germany played a large role in the student protests 
of the 1960s.  After World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany, with the 
Constitution of 1949, attempted to forestall the postwar political chaos of the Weimar 
Republic by expanding the power of parliament and political parties at the expense of the 
office of the president.  A five percent rule was also introduced which reduced the 
number of political parties represented in parliament.  Increased parliamentary power, 
coupled with the reduced number of parties, would give the Große Koalition incredible 
political control from 1966 to 1969.78  To many student activists and political opponents 
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of the SPD and the CDU, this looked frighteningly like the bid for power made by the 
Nazis in the early 1930s. 
 It was not until the young anti-authoritarians of the New Left began to question 
the previous generation about National Socialism that attempts to address and deal with 
that part of Germany’s history became anything other than intermittent and singular.  The 
Nachkriegskinder were raised in a tense silence when it came to National Socialism.  
Some parents did discuss the past, but such discussions were typically limited to the war 
itself and personal suffering during and after.  With the exception of singular issues such 
as reparations, the Nazi generation did not discuss the atrocities committed by the regime 
under which they had lived.  Therefore, it was not until the Nachkriegskinder reached 
university that many of the postwar generation began to learn more about the horrors of 
National Socialism.  The more they learned, the more they felt lied to by their parents.  
Because of the horrific nature of their parents’ pasts, this postwar generation became very 
active in opposing any and all forms of injustice, sometimes in controversial and 
confrontational ways.  They became extremely opposed to anything they considered 
fascist.  However, the student activists’ definition of fascism had been set by Das 
Argument and other left-wing journals; fascism became “an extreme response of 
capitalism to economic crises.”79  This link with capitalism would be crucial in the 
protests of the 68ers as they demonstrated against the United States, against Israel, and 
against their own government.  They, as the New Left had taught them, linked capitalism 
to National Socialism, making the government of the Federal Republic merely a 
continuation of the Third Reich. 
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 The answering protests that accompanied American action in Vietnam held a 
second significance for the West German student activists.  For many in the Federal 
Republic, the fact that Vietnam was tied to communism made the subject a delicate one 
since West Germany was supposed to be a bulwark against communist encroachment 
from the east.  The student protests against the Vietnam War incited a heated conflict 
between them and the Springer press concern that labeled them “reds.”  The student 
protests, however, were multilayered and not as simple as “communist.”  Leaders like 
Rudi Dutschke spoke of genocide in Indochina to incite the protestors but also because 
the young New Left saw such protests as their especial responsibility as Germans to 
oppose any actions related to fascism.  “The Vietnam War was subject to the double-
coding that defined young Germans’ perceptions.”80  Most events of their day they 
viewed as either stemming from the Nazi era or as throwbacks to Nazi policy.  Any 
authoritarian action was labeled fascist and therefore Nazi.  It became a responsibility of 
young West Germans to be anti-authoritarian in order to avoid repeating the crime of 
acquiescence committed by their parents.  Sometimes activists took this self-imposed 
responsibility to extremes and, at times, used aggressive hyperbole.  “In 1966, banners 
were secretly placed on the memorial site entrance at the Dachau concentration camp 
proclaiming, ‘Vietnam is the Auschwitz of America’ and ‘American leathernecks are 
inhuman murderers like the SS.’”81  Such hyperbole did draw public attention as intended 
but also served to relativize the Holocaust, erasing its uniqueness by linking it to other 
events.  Such historical relativism would be condemned as uncircumspect during the 
Historikerstreit (Historians’ Debate) of the mid 1980s. 
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 Controversial protests, like the banners at Dachau, by the students and the New 
Left made West Germans very uncomfortable.  Anti-communism was the only acceptable 
stance at the time since West Germany considered itself surrounded by communist 
oppression.  By the 1960s, West Berlin’s population had swelled due to an influx of 
young people: young men seeking to escape mandatory military service (West Berlin’s 
residents were exempt) and gays and other social non-conformists who sought the 
freedom of experience in the city’s historically tolerant neighborhoods.  Like Greenwich 
Village in New York and the Haight-Ashbury in San Francisco, West Berlin in the 1960s 
attracted a spectrum of non-conformists who often comprised the protestors and 
demonstrators.  West Berlin became a “radical-workshop stage.”82  The West Berlin 
68ers believed in Marxism, but for them Marx didn’t have anything to do with the people 
on the other side of the wall that shocked them when it was built in the early 1960s.  
Rather, Marxism was the opposite of the United States and the opposite of National 
Socialism.83  Marxism was a tool of their protest and Marxists revolutionaries such as 
Rosa Luxemburg and Che Guevara were the objects of hero worship in West Berlin 
among the student activists who carried placards with these faces on them at protests.  
The conservative West German press used such images to paint the students as supporters 
of East Germany and even spies which fed the near-hysterical anti-communism of some 
West Berliners and led to more incidents of violence, not just between students and 
police, but also with counter-demonstrators.  When the student protestor, Ohnesorg, was 
shot and killed by police during a demonstration in early June 1967, the violence 
escalated.  The activists blamed not only the police, but the Springer press concern and 
                                                
82 Jane Kramer, The Politics of Memory: Looking for Germany in the New Germany (New York: Random 
House, 1996), 8. 
83 Ibid., 103-104. 
 40
the government.  “At an emotional meeting on the night of June 2 [the day Ohnesorg was 
killed] of the German SDS (Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund), the future RAF 
founder Gudrun Ensslin exclaimed ominously: ‘This fascist state means to kill us all….  
Violence is the only answer to violence.  This is the Auschwitz generation, and there’s no 
arguing with them.’”84  The press served to polarize the situation by reporting 
inaccuracies in favor of the police and the conservative politicians of the CDU 
condemned the students for attempting to incite a riot and vowed to have all such student 
activists removed from the universities.85  Student response was not immediate, but when 
it did come the following year, it would shake a great many West Germans out of their 
comfort zone. 
Their Explosive Year 
 1968 was an explosive year in the Federal Republic of Germany and is the reason 
why the activists of this generation are called 68ers.  On 1 February, a demonstration 
once again turned deadly when a right-wing extremist counter-protestor was killed in a 
clash with anti-fascist protestors.86  That same month, students and intellectuals 
participated in a “Springer Tribunal,” which declared the Springer press concern to be a 
dangerous monopoly that deliberately incited violence against the students.  As a result of 
the so-called tribunal, Springer offices were attacked but suffered only minimal damage.  
On 2 April 1968, members of the APO attacked two department stores in Frankfurt, 
setting fires after closing time.  Two of the future founders of the violent activist group 
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Rote Armee Fraktion87 (RAF), Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin, were arrested and 
charged with arson.  That same month, a young right-wing extremist shot Rudi Dutschke, 
one of the leaders of the APO and the SDS, in West Berlin.  Dutschke survived the 
attack, but protests exploded all over the Federal Republic.  Violent confrontations 
between police and demonstrators took place in front of Springer offices and activists 
interfered with the delivery of Springer papers all over the country.  For many of the 
activists it was obvious that the authoritarian government and its fascist press were 
targeting them the way the Nazis had targeted the Jews.  “Since the Third Reich, the 
object of attack has been switched: the hooked Jewish nose in [the infamous Nazi 
weekly] Der Stürmer had been replaced in the cartoons in Bild and BZ88 by the beard of 
the student, considered subhuman like a gorilla.  The demand “Jews Out” prepared the 
way for the gas chamber.”89  By equating themselves with the Jewish victims of the Nazi 
genocide the students were placing themselves on a martyr’s pedestal, which in West 
Germany could be an unassailable position.  In short, it empowered them in the light of 
their nation’s history and they felt themselves absolved of any guilt for continued 
violence. 
 In May 1968, thousands of protestors marched on Bonn in opposition to the 
Notstandgesetzte which were passed at the end of that month.  In November, more 
violent clashes between police and student protestors took place in West Berlin.  Also in 
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November 1968, twenty-nine-year-old Beate Klarsfeld slapped Chancellor Kiesinger in 
the face and called him a Nazi on the stage at the CDU congress in West Berlin.90 
 Many of the resistors, as some of the student protestors began to call themselves, 
followed the intellectual, Herbert Marcuse.  Andreas Baader quoted Marcuse’s essay 
“Repressive Tolerance” at his arson trial.  In that essay, Marcuse denounced the 
perversion of tolerance in advanced industrialized nations and advocated resistance, even 
violent resistance, something the future members of the RAF internalized.91  However, 
for many of the 68ers, the violence of 1968 and their failure to prevent the passage of the 
Notstandgesetzte drastically reduced the momentum of the movement.  The APO 
disbanded in 1968 and even the splinter groups of the SDS likewise dissolved in early 
1970.92  As a result, a few of the frustrated activists joined more extremist groups like the 
RAF and enacted violence that culminated in the German Autumn of 1977 when the RAF 
committed kidnapping and murder in the name of their cause. 
Anti-Zionism and the 68ers 
 The student activists of the 1960s viewed themselves as champions of good 
causes such as sexual liberation, women’s rights, and in 1967, the Palestinians.  Prior to 
the Arab-Israeli War, the young New Leftists were pro-Israel, most likely as a reflection 
of the West Germany’s philo-Zionism.  The Arab-Israeli War changed all of that with 
images of Palestinians suffering under the violent oppression of invading Israelis. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the student generation began 
to reject the blackout history that characterized the 
underside of the official “Wiedergutmachung” [literally, 
making up for], and many were morally outraged at the 
inability of the previous generation to confront the horrors 
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of Auschwitz.  With the Six-Day-War, however, the 
situation reversed itself: German conservatives now 
embraced Israeli military success as a vindication of their 
own wartime behavior and the tabloid press was so 
unabashedly identified with this aspect of Israel, that the 
student Left did an about face, now seeing Israel as the 
imperialist aggressor and the Palestinians as the heroic 
victims.  By calling the Palestinians the “Jew’s Jew” the 
mantel of guilt could be completely removed.93 
 
For the young Leftists in West Germany, the Palestinians were transformed into Jews; 
they became the victims of fascist imperialist aggression.  By 1970, with the visit of the 
Israeli foreign minister to Germany, the 68ers were anti-Zionist, describing Israel as a 
“Zionist, economically and politically parasitic state.”94  Any number of reasons for this 
change in position have been proposed: that the students were reflecting the buried anti-
Semitism of Nazi parents; that they had a desire to vilify Israel, thereby expunging some 
of Germany’s guilt; or that because they were the Nachkriegskinder (postwar children), 
they were innocent of Nazi guilt, including that of anti-Semitism, and as such were free 
to condemn Israel without any moral or ethical constraints.95 
 Whatever the psychological reasons behind this rising anti-Zionism, some young 
Leftists considered violence an acceptable form of protest against Israel.  One of the more 
extreme activists, Dieter Kunzelmann, saw it as his duty to resist the oppression of Israel 
by force and consequently plotted a bombing of the Jewish Community Center in Berlin.  
The bomb was set to explode on 9 November 1969 when over two hundred people would 
be gathered in the Community Center to remember Kristallnacht.  The bomb failed to 
detonate.  In a 2005 interview with die tagezeitung, Tilman Fichter (brother of Albert 
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Fichter, the man who planted the bomb for Kunzelmann) described Kunzelmann and the 
anti-Semitism that underlay this student activist’s motives.  According to Fichter, 
Kunzelmann promoted “anti-Semitism tout court,” rather than the analytical/intellectual 
anti-Semitism of the rest of the New Left that was supposed to distinguish between “the 
Jews in the diaspora and the State of Israel.”96  What is interesting is that Fichter tried to 
make a distinction between what he saw as two different forms of the same prejudice, but 
he never denied 68er anti-Semitism.  For him, it was an intellectual, political issue that 
required analysis and debate while Kunzelmann’s violent anti-Semitism was more 
visceral.  The other leftist activists of the student movement failed to discuss either the 
failed bomb attack or Kunzelmann’s anti-Semitism, however.  Fichter described the topic 
as taboo: 
It was taboo to say there could be something like anti-
Semitism on the Left.  Because the Left had been a victim, 
because it had suffered together with the Jews in the 
concentration camps, it never thought it possible that this 
problem could also exist in its own ranks.  I [Fichter] was 
severely criticized at the time, even by comrades I still 
think highly of today.  They said, “Tilman, you shouldn’t 
make such a big thing of it.  We can settle this internally.”  
When I started discussing it openly with my article on anti-
Semitism I was treated like a bit of renegade, as if I were 
eroding solidarity on the Left, and opening up a can of 
worms that had to be cleared up among ourselves.  But it 
was never cleared up.  That was the problem.97 
 
Avoiding the issue, refusing to address the situation, and most especially indulging in 
violent anti-Semitism, these were the exact things the 68ers accused their parents’ 
generation of doing and the irony did not stop with the 68ers ignoring the issue.  Some of 
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the activists eventually became anti-Semitic right-wing extremists; Horst Mahler, for 
example. 
 Horst Mahler was a leftist activist who became associated with the violent protest 
group called the Rote Armee Fraktion.  When Andreas Baader was put on trial for the 
Frankfurt department stores arson, Mahler was one of the lawyers who represented him.  
Mahler continued to represent the RAF until his arrest in October 1970.  He was arrested 
based on an anonymous tip that labeled him as a member of the violent group.  Mahler 
was acquitted at his first trial but later convicted in 1973 for participation in armed 
robberies and for being a founding member of the RAF.  The RAF was classified as a 
terrorist organization in the Federal Republic and membership was therefore illegal.  
After the violence of the German Autumn of 1977, Mahler turned away from not only the 
RAF, but from leftist activism.98  He was released from prison in 1980 and resumed his 
legal practice with the help of former leftist comrade and future West German 
Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder.  Twenty years later, the former left-wing activist declared 
that he had joined the NPD, Germany’s right-wing extremist party.  Then Mahler began 
to host retreats where right-wing extremists would plan the so-called “Fourth Reich”, 
which was supposed to replace what the extremists believed to be an illegitimate 
government forced on them by occupiers.99  Interviewed by the Times of London after 
one of these neo-Nazi gatherings where he declared that the “Jews and their cult” would 
be banned in the new Reich, Mahler opined that the protest of the 68ers was never against 
the Nazi generation.  Instead, he claimed that the protests were about opposing American 
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imperialism only.100  In contrast to Mahler’s political about-face, other former 68ers drew 
closer to the political center while still others became officials in the German 
government.  With the exception of some remaining extremists like Mahler, the 68ers, on 
their long march through the institutions, became a part of the establishment; instead of 
fighting the system, they became the system. 
Social Change 
 Despite the public and often controversial attempts by the 68ers to change 
conceptions of the past, there did not seem to be widespread support among the Germans 
of the Federal Republic for them.  Thanks in part to the reporting practices of Springer 
journalists, the press portrayed the students as communists and this view was echoed in 
the population.  The label of communism was a dangerous one, most especially in the 
“island” of West Berlin.  This labeling probably prevented the efforts of the 68ers from 
being more effective and extensive.  There would be no breaking away from the past, no 
drawing line.  The Federal Republic of Germany, as a whole, would slowly alter its 
perceptions of its National Socialist past in the 1960s.  The victims of National Socialism 
began to gain a greater voice in both literature and drama and the mid 1960s saw the 
establishment of a number of concentration camp memorials.101  The Jews emerged to the 
forefront of the lists of Nazi victims, helped in part by the 68ers; at least until the 1967 
Arab-Israeli War.  This war, in which Israel was seen by the West German activists as 
imperialist aggressors, eliminated popular support for Israel among the students.  
Suddenly the Palestinians had their cause taken up by the same anti-authoritarian anti-
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fascists that denounced Nazism in their West German government.  In an interesting turn 
of logic, the Israelis/Jews had become the Nazi-like oppressors of the poor Palestinians.  
The 68ers began to decry the philo-Semitism and philo-Zionism of their denazified 
parents.  The APO and other student activist organizations became anti-Zionist and anti-
Israel.  The student generation’s anti-authoritarian, anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist stance 
was stronger than their dedication to uncovering the truth about their parents’ National 
Socialist past.  By the 1970s, it appeared that the 68ers’ activism on behalf of the “truth 
behind Nazism” was in fact a tool to discredit politicians, denounce government, and put 
forward the cause of sexual liberation.  The forward progress in National Socialist and 
Holocaust history made by and because of the student activists called the 68ers was vital, 
nonetheless.  In pursuit of their agenda, they forced their fellow West Germans to 
examine the Third Reich in greater detail and exposed a number of politicians for being 
former Nazis.   
 The change effected by the protests of the 68ers was a breaking of what Hermann 
Lübbe called the “communicative silence.”  “The postwar generation of activists of 1967 
and 1968 succeeded in disrupting the ‘communicative silencing’ of the Nazi past on a 
broad scale and in calling up the repressed memory of Auschwitz in the collective 
consciousness.  This was a moral achievement, for which this generation alone would 
have every reason to be proud.”102  The 68ers would continue their attack on this 
collective silence in the 1990s with a controversial exhibition designed to expose the 
truth about twenty million “innocent” Germans. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE MYTH OF THE “GOOD” WEHRMACHT: THE EXHIBITION OF THE 68ERS 
AND THEIR CONTINUED CONFRONTATION WITH THE PAST 
 
 
 In the 1990s, the Hamburg Institute for Social Research (HIS) wanted to explore 
violence in the 20th century. It launched a project entitled, Angesichts unseres 
Jahrhunderts.  Gewalt und Destruktivität im Zivilisationsprozeß. (In the Light of Our 
Century: Violence and Destructiveness during the Twentieth Century).  Under the 
direction of Doctor Jan Philipp Reemtsma, the Institute developed an exhibition that was 
to explore the role of the German military in National Socialist atrocities during the 
Second World War.  Opening in March 1995, Wehrmacht und NS-Verbrechen. 
Wirklichen und Wirkungen einer kollektiven Gewalterfahrung (The Wehrmacht and Nazi 
Crimes: Realities and Impacts of a Collective Experience) concentrated on the 
Wehrmacht’s actions in Serbia, Byelorussia, and Stalingrad.  Hannes Heer,103 a former 
68er who designed and chaired the exhibition, wanted to illustrate the consciously 
criminal nature of the actions of the Wehrmacht within the context of the war, which, the 
Institute argued, was entirely criminal itself.  Heer and the Institute treated the crimes 
committed by the Wehrmacht as intentional rather than as unforeseen by-products of the 
violence of war.104  By portraying the guilt of an organization long believed to be 
innocent, the Wehrmacht exhibition “forced the issue of war crimes into German homes, 
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often for the first time.”105  This would allow a new generation to confront their nation’s 
past. 
Myth-Making and the History of Innocence 
 Did the German Wehrmacht, during the Second World War, commit atrocities?  
The position among historians originally favored the view of the "good" Wehrmacht.  
The dispute over this has heated up in recent decades with more historians positing the 
guilt of the German army.  The debate raged over four major categories of Wehrmacht 
participation in the atrocities committed by the Nazis on the eastern front: the army 
needing and protesting in favor of the POW and Jewish labor force in their clothing, 
armaments, and other manufacturing areas; the Wehrmacht taking no action, for or 
against, but merely observing the murderous actions of the Einsatzgruppen and the 
Special Order Police; troops rounding up victims and handing them over to the 
Einsatzgruppen to be killed; or soldiers of the regular army capturing, enslaving, 
torturing, and killing the people themselves. 
 Where did the legend of the “good” Wehrmacht originate?  It must partly have 
come from wartime propaganda such as the article published in the Hamburger 
Fremdenblatt on 24 July 1942, in a report on the Jews in Holland: 
Our correspondent in Amsterdam informs us that Dutch 
citizens are showing a lively animosity toward the Jews.  
The Jews have appealed to the Wehrmacht for protection.  
Despite the eternal Jewish enmity, the Wehrmacht has 
taken the Jews under its protection, and, at their request, 
has transferred them to Germany, where they will be 
employed according to their ability.  To show their 
gratitude for this generosity, the Jews have put their 
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furniture and apartments at the disposal of the German 
victims of the English bombings.106 
 
As preposterous as this now sounds, this newspaper report probably allowed more than a 
few Germans to rest a little easier when it came to stories of brutality from the front; and 
most Germans would not wish to entertain such terrible thoughts of a husband, son, or 
father in the Wehrmacht killing innocent civilians. 
 Another possible basis for the “good” Wehrmacht legend is the fact that the 
Allied Tribunal, after the war, declared the General Staff and High Command not to be 
criminal organizations according to Article 9 of the Charter for the International Military 
Tribunal, unlike the SS107 and SD.108  Dr. Hans Laternser, counsel for the defense of the 
General Staff and High Command, was also quite adept at refuting the statements 
delivered by Nazi witnesses against the Wehrmacht.  He convinced the court of the self-
serving nature of the testimony of such high ranking Nazi officials as SS-Generals 
Schellenberg109 and Ohlendorf.110  Laternser further declared that the army had played no 
role in the exterminations; this despite the evidence delivered by Rudolf Höss on 5 April 
1946 which stated that the transports that delivered the Soviet POWs, as well as the Jews, 
to the camps were staffed and commanded by the Wehrmacht.111  
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 The Tribunal declared that the OKW112 (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) was, in 
fact, merely “an aggregation of military men, a number of individuals who happen at a 
given period of time to hold the high-ranking military positions.”113  Defining an army or 
its command as a criminal organization held obvious problems for the International 
Military Tribunal; too broad a definition and any military could be considered guilty.  To 
solve this problem, one of the judges suggested that the definition be based on that of 
conspiracy.  "To declare an organization criminal…all the Court needed to do was define 
the organization as having a membership limited to those who knew the group was 
criminal and who had joined voluntarily."114  Based on this narrower definition, the 
Tribunal declared the OKW to be a non-criminal organization.  The three Western Allied 
judges overruled the dissenting Soviet judge in this decision.  The Judgment then went on 
to censure the brutal actions of the General Staff and High Command of the Wehrmacht 
and, basically, accuse them of conduct unbecoming officers: 
When it suits their defense they say they had to obey; when 
confronted with Hitler’s brutal crimes, which are shown to 
have been within their general knowledge, they say they 
disobeyed.  The truth is they actively participated in all 
these crimes, or sat silent and acquiescent, witnessing the 
commission of crimes on a scale larger and more shocking 
than the world has ever had the misfortune to know.115  
 
Reprimanding someone does not have nearly the same effect as a conviction by a court of 
law.  By declaring the General Staff and High Command of the Wehrmacht non-
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criminals and by dismissing the commanders with only a dressing down, the Tribunal in 
effect released the whole of the Wehrmacht from complicity in and guilt for the crimes 
against humanity planned and perpetrated by the Third Reich.  This not-guilty verdict 
placed the Wehrmacht in a category closer to that of victims; they had successfully 
presented themselves as unwilling, order-following pawns, the typical defense at 
Nuremberg.  Once that happened, it was left to historians to illustrate the guilt of the 
common Wehrmacht soldier in World War II. 
 According to one argument in favor of the "good" Wehrmacht, they were not 
guilty of crimes against humanity because they tried to save the Jews and Soviet POWs 
for their labor force.  Their motives here, while admittedly not altruistic, were still not in 
opposition to the murderous policies of the Third Reich.  The debate following the Polish 
campaign of 1939 was between the Attritionists and the Productionists.  The Attritionists 
such as Himmler, Heydrich, and the SS, wanted to solve the Jewish problem by leaving 
the Jews to die from malnutrition, starvation, and disease.  The Productionists, who were 
mainly Wehrmacht commanders, saw the Jews as labor and even skilled labor, who could 
aid the German war effort.  They would use this same argument concerning the 5.7 
million Soviet POWs (of which only 2.4 million survived116) the Wehrmacht captured 
after Operation Barbarossa in 1941.   
 Productionists such as General von Ginant, the commander of the Wehrmacht in 
the Government-General (Poland), protested the removal of the Jews working in German 
army industry.  In a memorandum to the OKW dated 18 September 1942, von Ginant 
listed areas of production in which 25% to 100% of the laborers were Jewish.  He 
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estimated that out of roughly one million industrial workers in occupied Poland, 300,000 
were Jewish and a third of those were skilled workers.  Von Ginant hoped to impress 
upon his commanders in the Wehrmacht the necessity of stopping the immediate removal 
of his Jewish workforce.  He argued that military industry would suffer from a drastic 
reduction of labor, including skilled labor, which would cost precious time in training 
replacement personnel.  He suggested that the removal of the Jews be carried out locally, 
step by step.  "The general policy will be to eliminate the Jews from work as quickly as 
possible without harming work of military importance."117  General von Ginant did not 
protest the killing of the Jews and he was not resistant to the removal of them from his 
workforce, he only took exception to the speediness of their withdrawal. 
 By 1944, those Jewish workers had been replaced with approximately two million 
prisoners of war who took positions in such army industries as “armaments and 
munitions in flagrant violation of the Hague and Geneva conventions, which stipulated 
that no war prisoners could be employed in such tasks."118  The Russian children 
encountered by the Wehrmacht were not spared either.  They were rounded up by the 
thousands to be shipped to the Reich in order to fill a need for apprentices.  Alfred 
Rosenberg’s119 office wrote a memorandum in June 1944 about this practice along the 
eastern front.  “Army Group Center intends to apprehend forty to fifty thousand youths 
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from the age of 10 to 14…and transport them to the Reich."120  Of especial note, in the 
memorandum from the Political Section of Wehrmacht headquarters in June 1944 on this 
action is the statement that the idea originated in the Ninth Army.121  Wehrmacht 
commanders were, especially in 1944, active in devising ways of obtaining the slave 
labor they craved.  This Heuaktion (Hay Action) was also intended as a racial measure in 
that it was “not only aimed at preventing a direct reinforcement of the enemy’s strength 
but also as a reduction of his biological potentialities."122  The document mentioned 
propaganda to be used in support of the action entitled “Reich Aid to White Russian 
Children, Protection Against the Partisans,” as well as a similar action under way within 
another army group, which was also pressing acceptable teenage Russian boys into 
service in the SS.123    
 Some historians, and most former soldiers, argued that the Wehrmacht did not 
take part in the killings along the eastern front in World War II.  They claim that the army 
itself took no action, for or against the slaughter; that they merely observed the 
murderous actions of the Einsatzgruppen, the Special Order Police, and other killing 
squads.  In Poland in 1940, Walther von Brauchitsch (Commander in Chief of the 
German Army at the time) was concerned that the Wehrmacht was suffering lapses in 
discipline due to the exterminations carried out by the Einsatzgruppen.  As occupiers, he 
wanted the army's reputation among the Poles to be secure.  Von Brauchitsch was also 
worried about the negative effects observation of the killings was having on his men.  
"We need not mention again the unhappy role played by the Wehrmacht, forced to be a 
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passive witness to these crimes."124  It is interesting to note that he used the word 
"crimes," a general term for dissenting Wehrmacht commanders to use in reference to the 
Einsatzgruppen's actions.  This is not to say that von Brauchitsch or the other army 
commanders were against the murders.  Rather, they were against the way the people 
were being killed and the ill effects it was having on the troops and the population.  "The 
methods and means of slaughter employed are most damaging [for us], complicating the 
problem, and making matters far worse than they might have been if a sensible and 
systematic course of action had been taken."125  Von Brauchitsch argued against the 
brutal methods employed in Poland out of apprehension that it was providing the enemy 
with easy propaganda, giving the Poles a reason to protect the Jews, and would result in 
lower moral standards of "the most valuable German human material."126  As typical with 
such protests from the Wehrmacht, he never raised objections to the murders themselves.  
Then, in May 1941, the leaders of the Wehrmacht met with the RSHA 
(Reichssicherheitshauptamt, the Reich Security Main Office) to discuss the imminent 
invasion of the USSR, the Criminal Orders127 and to negotiate Einsatzgruppen functions 
along the eastern front in the Soviet Union.  With von Brauchitsch's earlier objections in 
mind, the Wehrmacht agreed to cooperate in the ideological war under the stipulation that 
the executions of the "enemies" be carried out in a more unobtrusive manner.128   
 The Criminal Orders, which were discussed at the meeting, carried four sets of 
instructions to the Wehrmacht commanders and the SS.  Part one regulated the 
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Einsatzgruppen and gave them the freedom to operate directly behind the front lines.  
Part two, Die Einschränkung der Kriegsgerichtsbarkeit (the Curtailment of Military 
Jurisdiction), made it legal to shoot any and all persons suspected of guerrilla activities.  
It also ordered that if no suspect could be located, then the local civilians were to bear the 
brunt of the reprisals.  The third part of the Criminal Orders was the infamous 
Kommissarbefehl129 that ordered that all Soviet political commissars be taken prisoner 
and executed immediately.  The last part of the Criminal Orders consisted of the 
"Guidelines for the Conduct of the Troops in Russia."  This part of the orders demanded 
the annihilation of any and all forms of resistance, especially that from "Bolshevik 
agitators, guerrillas, saboteurs and Jews."130 A further order was given by Reichenau on 
10 October 1941 which made perfectly clear his intentions regarding Jews: "the soldier 
must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman 
Jewry."131  What action was taken in dissent by OKW leaders took the form of 
supplemental orders attached to the Criminal Orders.  Von Brauchitsch issued one such 
supplemental order on 24 May 1941, prior to Operation Barbarossa. 
Criminal acts of a minor nature are, always in accordance 
with the combat situation, to be punished according to 
detailed orders from an officer (if possible, a post 
commander) by resorting to provisional measures (for 
instance), temporary detention at reduced rations, roping-up 
on a tree, assignment to labour).  …It must not come to it 
that the individual soldier commits or omits any act he 
thinks proper toward the indigenous population; he must 
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rather feel that in every case he is bound by the orders of 
his officers.132 
 
 First and foremost, von Brauchitsch was worried about threats to the discipline of his 
troops, not humanitarian issues regarding the systematic slaughter of civilians.  "Issuing 
vague supplemental orders was the same method the army used during the Polish 
campaign to weaken Hitler's orders that soldiers not be punished for any offensives 
against Jews."133  Von Brauchitsch's supplement to the Kommissarbefehl was as vague as 
it needed to be in order to prevent Hitler dismissing it.  It, like many such supplemental 
orders, was open to any number of personal interpretations by the officers to whom it was 
issued and who, in turn, enforced it or not among their men.  
 Despite this one concession, the executions were still public enough for rumors of 
them to circulate within the Reich itself and for soldiers to view them and comment in 
letters and diaries.  After the Nazi press published pictures of an alleged Soviet bloodbath 
in East Prussia, a 6 November 1944 report to the Stuttgart SD recounted local statements 
and remarks spurred by the anti-Soviet government propaganda. 
What motive does the leadership have in publishing 
pictures like those in the NS-Kurier on Saturday?  They 
must surely realize that every intelligent person, upon 
seeing these victims, will immediately think of the 
atrocities we have committed on enemy soil, yes even in 
Germany.  Did we not slaughter the Jews by the thousands?  
Don't soldiers repeatedly tell of Jews who had to dig their 
own graves in Poland?  And what did we do with the Jews 
who were in the KZ [concentration camp] in Alsace?  After 
all, Jews are also human.  We have only shown the enemy 
what they can do with us should they win.134 
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The German public as far from the front lines as southwestern Germany knew what their 
troops were doing the east.  Even more heinously, some executions became little more 
than freakish side shows, spectacles intended to entertain the troops in the area.  One such 
event took place in Zhitomir in Ukraine in August 1941 as described by a Wehrmacht 
soldier present.  “One day a Wehrmacht vehicle drove through Zhitomir with a 
megaphone.  Over the loudspeaker we were informed…that at a certain time that day 
Jews would be shot in the market-place."135  What followed was a sadistic show of 
beatings and murder for the benefit of the troops and, no doubt, the pleasure of the men 
of the SS-Einsatzgruppen.  Far from being passively entertained, some Wehrmacht 
soldiers even joined the slaughter.  “One member of an Einsatzgruppen (mobile killing 
squad) claimed after the war that ‘on some occasions members of the Wehrmacht took 
the carbines out of our hands and took our place in the firing-squad."136  Then in August 
1942, Hitler issued another order intended to contain the "bandit" problem along the 
eastern front.  "The Chief of the Army General Staff is solely responsible for action 
against bandits in operational areas.  …There must be no German in the area threatened 
by bandits who is not engaged, actively or passively, in the fight against them."137  The 
definition of bandit was left to the discretion of the commander interpreting it, but usually 
meant partisans, Jews, and any civilian suspected of anti-German activity.  It also left no 
doubt that no one would be allowed to disobey said order. 
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 Another facet of the argument for the "good" Wehrmacht is the myth of animosity 
between the army and Himmler's SS.  Largely it has been the lukewarm attempts at 
challenging the brutal actions of the Einsatzgruppen in Poland and early in the Russian 
campaign by a couple of OKW leaders, and later, the harsh measures taken by the SS to 
discourage army deserters, that has provided support for this view.  Nevertheless, the 
simple fact is that without the cooperation of the Wehrmacht the Einsatzgruppen would 
not have been able to kill the number of people that they did.  There was actually such a 
high level of cooperation between the army and Himmler's SS that what regularly 
occurred was the Wehrmacht's participation in the collection of Russians (most of whom 
were civilians) to give to the SS for execution.  In other instances, the SS would assist the 
Wehrmacht in army operations.  In an Einsatzgruppen Activity and Situation Report, it 
was recorded that "a Kommando of the Security Police and the SD consisting of sixty 
men was put at the disposal of the 87th Division for use against Russian Cavalry."138  
Initially, the Wehrmacht turned a disinterested eye to the "eliminations" performed by the 
Einsatzgruppen, but very shortly, soldiers from the regular army were participating in the 
executions.  Around September 1941, local army commanders learned that twenty-one 
German soldiers had been shot in Topala, Moldavia (at the time, a part of the Ukraine).  
"As a reprisal two thousand one hundred Jews and Gypsies were killed solely by the 
Wehrmacht."139  There are reports from numerous other such actions taken in revenge by 
the army. 
 Some historians argue that because the troops were so far from the ideological 
center of the Third Reich, the commanders of individual divisions could and frequently 
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did dissent by ignoring the Kommissarbefehl.  There can be little doubt, and there is 
some evidence to support, that not every commander followed the Criminal Orders in the 
same way.  Such variance was built into the orders themselves.  They were left 
purposefully vague enough to encourage Wehrmacht commanders to interpret them 
themselves based on the ideology in which they had been indoctrinated.  This could 
conceivably have allowed some commanders to disregard such orders, as Jay Baird 
pointed out in his book, Nazi War Propaganda:   
As a general rule, the farther one traveled from Hitler's 
headquarters, the more humane were the Army directives 
regarding the treatment of the Russian population.  Indeed, 
many field commanders issued orders that the Russians 
were to be treated as Allies.  Some went so far as to 
declare, "Whoever among the indigenous population 
participates in the struggle against Bolshevism…is not our 
enemy but our fellow-fighter and fellow-worker in the 
struggle against the world-foe."140  
 
Unfortunately, the possibility of a large number of Wehrmacht commanders issuing 
orders openly contradictory to those given by the OKW or Hitler or simply ignoring the 
ones received is highly unlikely.  Those commanders would have been committing 
blatant treason and executed for it immediately.  Manneszucht (military discipline) was 
the mandate of the Wehrmacht and anything that interfered with it was dealt with 
decisively.  "Desertion and subversion were regarded as particularly serious offenses 
insofar as they threatened discipline among the troops.  These crimes were thus 
prosecuted relentlessly; and they occasioned most of the death sentences that were 
imposed by German courts martial during the Second World War."141  Whether the 
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troops followed the Criminal Orders out of agreement with the ideology or from fear of 
punishment, they followed the orders.  Any sizable amount of disobedience by the 
military along the eastern front, as suggested by Baird, would not have gone unnoticed 
and unpunished.   
 Secondly, such an order would and could never have included Jews.  Since the 
invasion of Poland in the autumn of 1939, treatment of any and all Jews encountered by 
the Germans, whether by the Wehrmacht or the SS, was intentionally and ideologically 
brutal.  And third, the order quoted by Baird is dated 14 March 1943, nearly two years 
after the invasion of the Soviet Union.  To give the order the proper weight it must be 
placed in its context within the war.  In September 1942, during the Battle of Stalingrad, 
the Wehrmacht was unexpectedly tied down within the city by snipers and other Soviet 
soldiers and guerrillas, and was split in two when Hitler sent a sizable portion of the army 
south to the Caucasus with the intention of capturing the oil fields there.  In early 
November 1942, the Western Allies were victorious at El Alamein.  The Soviet 
counteroffensive at Stalingrad was launched on 19 November 1942 and in very early 
January of 1943 the Germans were forced to withdraw from the Caucasus after over-
extending their supply lines.  The United States began their bombing raid on Germany 
proper on 27 January 1943 and the vital Soviet victory at Kursk was in early February 
1943.  Around the time Baird's order was given, the Wehrmacht was engaging the Red 
Army at Kharkov.142  Kharkov, or Kharkiv, located in eastern Ukraine, was a territory 
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known to have had German sympathizers (prior to Generalplan Ost143).  The order 
quoted by Baird was most likely given out of the desire not to alienate further a people 
(Hilfswilliger144) who had helped the German army in the past and a need for cooperation 
from as much of the local population as possible to ensure fewer distractions from the 
battle, if not assistance against the Soviets.  When placed in context, the order Baird 
quoted that he suggested exonerated Wehrmacht commanders appears as yet another 
political and calculated move to ensure German victory over the Soviet Union.     
 In fact, the typical German soldier invading the Soviet Union in 1941 viewed 
ruthlessness toward the Russians as either deserved or necessary.  One lieutenant in the 
Wehrmacht stationed in Russia wrote in his journal about a Russian prisoner who burned 
himself on the camp stove.  The injured man was denied medical attention and left 
outside in November in -20° C weather to die in the snow until another Russian prisoner 
of war wrapped him in a cloak and carried the man back to the POW camp.  The 
lieutenant then commented in his journal: 
But one should always remember, when reading this, that 
200,000 German soldiers died in Siberia in the Great War 
[World War I].  Perhaps many more suffered even more 
painfully than this Russian who, after all, is only one of 
many.  Russia, a land of cruelty, will likewise be handled 
cruelly.145     
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The young man's words echo with the justification and ideology of the regime he served 
and its Wehrmacht.  The Russians were numerous, barbarous Untermenschen who 
deserved to be eliminated by whatever means necessary to secure the future of the Third 
Reich and avenge the Great War.  These are not the words of a dissenter. 
 The International Military Tribunal dismissed the case against the Wehrmacht at 
Nuremberg.  It declared the German army to be a non-criminal organization and was 
therefore innocent of crimes against humanity.  This verdict, as well as the self-serving 
accounts written by Wehrmacht commanders after the war, has provided the foundation 
for the myth of the "good" Wehrmacht.  The supplemental orders to the Criminal Orders 
issued by such high ranking OKW leaders as von Brauchitsch have, for some historians, 
painted a picture of regular soldiers trapped by a ruthless, murderous regime with which 
they had nothing in common.  The truth, as far as it can be known, is that the Wehrmacht 
in World War II was not only complicit in the atrocities committed along the eastern 
front but perpetrated them as well.  It employed millions of slaves in its industries, some 
of whom it actively sought out.  Its troops stood patiently by and watched as the SS and 
SD slaughtered thousands in Poland and Russia.  Finally, the soldiers of the Wehrmacht 
captured, starved, and killed untold numbers of people along the German eastern front in 
the Second World War.   
Myth Confronted 
 The esoteric debate among historians over the guilt of the Wehrmacht has been all 
but decided.  Nevertheless, the German people have, for the last fifty years, been largely 
convinced of the innocence of the nearly twenty million men who served Hitler on the 
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front lines.  It took a highly controversial photographic exhibition to shatter, publicly, the 
myth of the good Wehrmacht. 
 Produced and hosted by the Hamburg Institute for Social Research, this itinerant 
exhibition was launched in 1995.  It was primarily a photographic display of atrocities 
carried out on the German eastern front during the Second World War.  The purpose of 
the exhibition was to explore the war of extermination carried out by the Nazis; this 
meant exposing the guilt of the last bastion of German innocence during the National 
Socialist period, the Wehrmacht.  During the 1950s, the focus of National Socialist 
history was on the guilt of the government bureaucrats of the Third Reich, the most 
visible of whom were tried at Nuremberg.  In the 1960s and 1970s, with the 68er revolts, 
the focus of National Socialist history turned from relativizing that history to the 
collective guilt of the Nazi generation.  In the 1980s, the debate on National Socialist 
history was whether the Holocaust was a singular, unique event or was Stalinist cruelty 
an equivalent.  Beginning in the 1990s with this controversial exhibition, the focus of 
National Socialist history was on the guilt of the “common man.” 
 The Wehrmacht exhibition, as part of the larger research project, “In Light of Our 
Century: Violence and Destructiveness during the Twentieth Century,” sought to expose 
the truth about the average German soldier in Hitler’s aggressive and criminal war on the 
Soviet Union and Europe.  It presented photographic evidence, often taken by the soldiers 
themselves, of the Wehrmacht’s participation in the Holocaust.  The HIS sought to 
overturn the misconception of the innocent German infantryman had held sway over the 
German public since the end of the war.   
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 After the Second World War, the necessity of rebuilding a destroyed Germany 
took precedent over understanding and addressing German guilt.  Every accusation of 
German guilt had been carefully balanced with descriptions of German suffering or, as in 
the 1960s, German contrition (i.e., reparations and Holocaust memorials). 
A variety of factors combined to produce the uneasy and 
faltering processes of confronting the past in the West [of 
Germany], which in the end amounted to a pious public 
confession of collective responsibility for acts which had 
been committed, in the passive voice, on the soil of 
Germany, in the name of the German people, but 
apparently not by any (or many) members of the German 
people.146 
 
Until the 68ers revolted against this repression, West German history operated under a 
thin veneer of contrition that covered a careful balancing act.  Many in the Federal 
Republic, most especially those of the war generation, balanced guilt for the Nazi regime 
and its atrocities with stories and images of German suffering during the war and after.  
Nearly thirty years after their initial revolt, the 68ers of the Nachkriegsgeneration once 
again mounted a campaign to confront the past.   
  In 1994, the year before the Wehrmacht exhibition, the city of Wülfrath 
presented an exhibition on the hardships of the immediate postwar years, entitled Zeichen 
der Not (Times of Misery).  Local citizens were asked to bring in items from 1945 to 
1948.  Those who had lived through that time were asked to come and share their 
experiences.  They were also asked to compare and contrast the postwar years with the 
war years.  For many of these people, the war was still too painful to discuss in any great 
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detail.147  The 68ers had managed to awaken Germany, but silence was still the mandate 
of a number of individuals of the war generation.  However, the German public faced 
reminders of National Socialism at every anniversary, read memoirs and scholarly books, 
watched documentaries and films, and attended a number of exhibitions.  The result of 
this, according to German literary editor, Sigrid Loffler, is that “Europe is at a standstill 
and looking back.  Grandchildren are writing about what happened to their grandparents, 
using diaries and reminiscences.  They’re relaxed, not personally involved like the 
generation of ’68, but they’re interested.  The Holocaust is the negative founding myth of 
the new, unified Europe.  We have to discuss the horrible stories of the 20th century.”148 
 The Wehrmachtsausstellung (Wehrmacht exhibition), as it came to be called, ran 
for four and a half years before succumbing to controversy over the accuracy of some of 
the photographs as well as the overall presentation of the images, some of which had no 
accompanying text.  This first exhibition was dismantled, reorganized, and re-presented a 
few years later under the new title, Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Dimensionen des 
Vernichtungskrieges 1941-1944 (Crimes of the German Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a 
War of Annihilation, 1941-1944).  “The information presented at this exhibition has a 
completely different emotional force than other exhibitions which deal with the Nazi 
Period.  This force is directed at the families.  This potentially concerns everyone.”149  
According to Reemstma, the intention of both exhibitions, aside from documenting 
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criminal acts, was to illustrate to the German people just how comprehensive was the 
guilt for the Holocaust  
 Reemstma, the director of the Hamburg Institute for Social Research, declared his 
Institute’s desire to impart to the visitor, through the photographs, a sense of being a 
contemporary witness.  He wanted people, within the context of the larger research 
project, to ask themselves, “how did it—not only through National Socialism—come to 
this immense demarcation of destruction?”150  As Reemtsma repeatedly explained, the 
Wehrmacht exhibition was not aimed at influencing the perceptions of historians who had 
known of and studied the Wehrmacht’s guilt for decades.  Rather, the Institute sought to 
challenge the perceptions of the German public, those who fought in the Wehrmacht and 
those whose fathers and grandfathers fought for Hitler.  Thomas Schmid, the reporter 
who interviewed Reemtsma in 1999 for the publication Die Welt, remarked during the 
interview that the Wehrmacht generation seemed absentminded when it came to their 
history.  Schmid proposed that the exhibition forced these men to reacquire a 
consciousness.  Reemtsma clarified that he believed the members of that generation had 
different perceptions, which made their reactions range from harsh denial to acceptance, 
because the Institute’s exhibition seemed to them to be a collective accusation against the 
entire Wehrmacht.  Reemtsma further explained that there were also many who 
welcomed the exhibition and told the Institute that such information should have been 
revealed in 1945 or in the years since.151    
 Hannes Heer, former 68er and organizer of the Wehrmacht exhibition, set out to 
demythologize the members of the German military as the pawns of Hitler, an idea that 
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fit quite comfortably into the two-wars theory developed in Germany as a way of 
repressing the truth about the past.  In the two-wars theory, the Second World War is cut 
in half with Hitler and his murderous plan occupying one side of the war effort and the 
Wehrmacht’s noble intentions of staving off communist hordes to protect Germany (and 
indeed, all of Europe) on the other side.  The HIS aimed to show World War II as an 
inherently criminal war with the Wehrmacht not merely verstrickt (caught-up in), but 
active participants.  “According to Hannes Heer, one of the exhibition’s creators and its 
most active proponent, the number of Jews killed ‘directly or indirectly’ by the 
Wehrmacht can be put at 1 to 2.5 million”.152  The majority of Nazi atrocities were 
committed on the eastern front and, because of Hitler’s ideological focus on the racial 
war, the majority of the nearly twenty million Wehrmacht soldiers rotated through that 
front.  These twenty million young men comprised nearly a quarter of Nazi Germany’s 
population.  This meant that during the war nearly every German family was related to or 
knew someone who was a member of the Wehrmacht, and the same was true in the 
1990s.  Immediately following the war and in the years after, veterans waged a campaign 
to whitewash their reputation, called Persilschein.  Veterans’ organizations would, and 
still do, hire lawyers to defend the honor of the Wehrmacht and discredit the research of 
such historians as Manfred Messerschmidt153 of the Militärgeschichtlisches 
Forschungsamt (Military History Research Organization).154 
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Objections and the Bundestag 
 Resistance to the Wehrmachtsausstellung was not limited to veterans, however.  
Debunking such an entrenched myth as that of twenty million innocent young men was 
certain to be met with backlash from many directions.  Initial objections were visceral 
and political.  Many Germans reacted negatively to the images displayed by the HIS, 
challenging what they claimed was a one-sided argument.  Some responded personally by 
relating lengthy autobiographical stories.  These veterans sought to rebut the evidence by 
presenting their own memories, while children and grandchildren would relate stories 
told them by a father or grandfather.  Some of the stories related by visitors were not 
accurate.  “A man, nearly 80, came to us [the HIS] and told us a story of how a group of 
Jewish children were saved.  It involved a known case and we were able to prove to the 
visitor, with all kinds of sources, that the children had in fact been murdered.”155 
 The personal impact of the history presented by the HIS, even at a distance of 
fifty years, was compounded by the political aspect that split Germany down the middle.  
The leftist political groups such as the Green Party (a political party containing a number 
of former 68ers) strongly supported the exhibition.  Rightist political groups such as the 
CDU and the CSU were hostile to the efforts of Heer and the HIS.  The political division 
sparked protests and demonstrations on both sides.156  Then, in 1997, the controversy was 
taken up by the Bundestag (the German Parliament). 
 By the time the Wehrmachtsausstellung reached Munich in February 1997 it was 
alternately condemned as a generalized indictment and haled as a torch of illumination.  
The German Parliament took up the debate in March of that year.  On 13 March, the 
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Green Party led the discussion when Representative Gerald Häfner defended the 
exhibition as a source of truth.  Häfner also expressed concern about 
Geschichtsklitterung, which he believed held sway over Germany.  Geschichtsklitterung 
is a kind of historical falsification where historical events or facts are joined in 
misleading ways.  It also refers to the omission of vital facts in order to slant evidence to 
fit a preformed conclusion.  This type of falsification is frequently used to whitewash war 
crimes and to enhance the positive aspects of a biography or an event.  The purpose of 
Geschichtsklitterung is to provide a conclusion differing from that of accepted 
historiography.157  Häfner accused the right-wing parties of this type of myth-making 
when they condemned the Wehrmacht exhibition for waging a moralischen 
Vernichtungsfeldzugs gegen das deutsche Volk (moral destruction campaign against the 
German people), a statement Häfner classified as right-wing propaganda.158   
 Dr. Alfred Dregger of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), a conservative 
political party, rejected Häfner’s entire speech.  Dregger then questioned the true purpose 
of the Wehrmachtsausstellung and the legitimacy of Hannes Heer and Jan Philipp 
Reemtsma.  Dregger accused both men of attempting to hurt the German people 
deliberately by foisting their subjective opinion on them.  He went on to exonerate not 
only the majority of the Wehrmacht but also the German people who lived under the 
Third Reich by separating them from “the criminal clique who had taken control.”  
Dregger spoke at length of the innocence of the Wehrmacht, citing many of the 
established arguments including the acquittal at Nuremberg.  He stated that all those who 
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described the Wehrmacht as a criminal organization lied.  Classifying those Germans 
who made such arguments as self-haters, he declared that they distracted everyone from 
the most important thing: “the deep mourning for victims of war and despotism…and of 
the infinite loss which the Nazis caused by the destruction of the German Jews.  Who 
knows what contributions they could have made to German science, to the German 
economy and to German culture.”  By Dregger’s definition, the Jews were a commodity 
and the German people and the men of the Wehrmacht were the victims.  Lastly, Dregger 
dismissed the Wehrmachtsausstellung as having nothing to contribute to German society 
but destructive generational conflict.159 
 When former 68er lawyer and future Minister of the Interior Otto Schily 
addressed the assembly, he related the discussion to the debate over the realizing of 
German history begun by the students in the 1960s.  Schily had been a friend of Rudi 
Dutschke’s and had worked closely with the SDS.  He was also one of the lawyers who 
had defended many members of the 1970s left-wing terrorist group, Rote Armee 
Fraktion, including Horst Mahler.160  In 1997, Schily made the same accusations against 
the right-wing political parties that the 68ers had made against the war generation: they 
were guilty of an indignation and inability to face the historical truth concerning the 
crimes of the Nazi dictatorship.  He deplored the attempts made by political opponents to 
discredit and dismantle the exhibition.  He also called for the use of more direct language 
in discussions of National Socialist history.  “The debate on the role of the Wehrmacht is 
difficult and painful, certainly.  But it is inevitable.  Unfortunately, the grammar of the 
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political language prefers the passive in historical retrospectives: it became, it passed, it 
occurred, it happened.  The subject, the individual, the debt, the responsibility disappears 
behind these veils of words.”161  But, he warned against the temptation of self-
righteousness so often present in the accusations of the 1960s.  He charged every German 
to deal honestly with his/herself and also to ask one more important question: how would 
you have acted in such an extreme situation as that illustrated by the exhibition?162  
Schily’s statements before the Bundestag during the Wehrmachtsausstellung debate are 
illustrative of how the argument of the 68ers had matured in thirty years to include other 
perspectives and a greater consideration for the hardships of their parents’ generation.   
 The 68ers made accusations and passed judgment on the war generation when 
they began their movement in the mid to late 1960s.  It was a hostile and severely 
politicized and polemicized environment.  While the Wehrmacht exhibition was met with 
hostility, particularly from conservative politicians and right-wing extremists, there was 
less of a sense of accusation in the questions from the younger generations.  Finally, the 
important questions were being asked by a German public inspired to confront the truth.  
“Thanks to the Wehrmacht exhibit, Germans broke the cycle of reiteration and 
repetition.”163  The exhibition, funded in part by former 68ers-turned-politicians and 
created by former 68er Hannes Heer, did spur great debate, but it also opened the door to 
communication between the generations; particularly between the war generation and 
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their grandchildren.164  Such questioning and unburdening was documented and often 
filmed by the HIS and negated the fears of destructive generational confusion and 
conflict expressed by the exhibition’s detractors in March 1997.   
 Hannes Heer made a distinction between the intentions of the protestors in the 
1960s and the purpose of his Wehrmacht exhibition.  The 68ers had initiated a dialogue 
with the past by framing it as an indictment of their parents.  In the 1990s, their tactic 
changed from demanding answers of their fathers to inquiry and self-reflection.  Echoing 
Schily, Heer stated that: 
Only if we can supplement the question “Father, where 
were you?” with the question “On which side would I have 
stood?  How would I have reacted?” will we be able to 
bring this war to an end.165 
 
Most likely, the war to which Heer referred was not the Second World War, but the 
friction between the generations sparked by the 68ers.   
 In thirty years, many 68ers had continued their search for the truth about their 
parents’ National Socialist past, as illustrated by the Wehrmachtsausstellung.  They spent 
their time writing articles and books as well as organizing and participating in historical 
conferences, debates, and exhibitions.  Many former 68ers, like Hannes Heer, dedicated 
their lives to uncovering and analyzing the truth about Germany’s history.  Others, like 
Otto Schily, embraced political office as the next stage of life.  All of them, however, left 
an indelible mark on Germany and the study of German history during their long march 
through the institutions; a march that culminated in the 68er administration of Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder, elected in 1998. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
TWO AFFAIRS: THE 68ER ADMINISTRATION AND THE END OF THE LONG 
MARCH 
 
 
 From headstrong teenagers to rebellious college students and street fighters to 
driven professionals and politicians—the 68ers ran the gamut of possibilities in one 
generation, leaving few stones unturned and few authorities unchallenged.  However, the 
new generation of Germany in the new millennium was seeking something other than 
68er idealism and the unrest that tended to accompany it.  In 2001, the controversy over 
Germany’s past shifted again.  As before, during the student revolts, objectors were 
pointing fingers at Germany’s public officials.  This time, however, the controversy was 
not surrounding National Socialism and the Nazi generation, it was the 68ers.  The 
accusations made in 2001 themselves differed very little from those made in 1968.  It was 
already common practice “to use the secure footing of the present to criticize the deeds of 
one’s parents and grandparents.”166  Back in the spotlight, the 68ers were being called 
upon by the next generation to give an accounting for their actions decades prior.  As 
they had confronted their parents, the 68ers of the Nachkriegsgeneration were confronted.   
 After the violence of the 1970s, which disillusioned more than one 68er, the 
former student radicals and street fighters continued on their long march through the 
institutions. Having fought the establishment for a number of years, many of them 
entered that establishment as politicians.  Two former 68ers-turned-politicans rose to 
prominence in the ensuing years.  Gerhard Schröder and the extremely popular Joschka 
Fischer formed the vanguard of the new administration.  Referred to as the 68er 
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administration, a socialist lawyer and a street-fighting autodidact completed the 68er 
journey through Germany’s institutions.   
 Gerhard Schröder was a member of the Young Socialists and became chairman of 
that organization in 1978.  He entered law school in 1966 and passed all requisite legal 
exams ten years later in 1976.  A Marxist and an environmentalist from the beginning, 
Schröder entered parliament in 1980 as a Social Democrat, the same year the Green Party 
was officially formed.167  That was also the year he helped friend and former RAF 
lawyer, Horst Mahler, re-enter society after being released from prison.  
 Joschka Fischer, the son a butcher, dropped out of school in 1965 and two years 
later, became deeply involved in the left-wing demonstrations in Stuttgart, moving from 
there to Frankfurt.168  Fischer cited the killing of Benno Ohnesorg in 1967 as a moment 
that would help define him.  “Looking back, his death was a tragedy that more than 
anything else, made me want to get involved in politics.  I wanted to make sure that 
nothing like that could ever happen in Germany again.”169  A self-styled autodidact, 
Fischer’s radicalist roots led him to join the Green Party and become a parliamentary 
representative in 1983, while his own ambition helped him lead his party into power in 
Schröder’s 1998 administration.  It was not an easy victory for Fischer.  Around the 
reunification of Germany, the Green Party had lost popularity and was split between the 
Realos and the Fundis.  Moderating his youthful radicalism, Fischer, as a Realo, wanted 
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the Greens to work within the political establishment.  The Fundis, in a nod to the party’s 
68er roots, wanted a return to the streets and the Außerparlamentarische Opposition.  The 
Realos won the argument and the Green Party subsequently gained more popular national 
support.170 
 Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, both the Green Party and the Social 
Democratic Party gained influence and popularity until in 1998, with the election of 
Gerhard Schröder as Chancellor of Germany, the two political parties entered into the 
Red/Green Coalition headed by Schröder and Joschka Fischer, Minister of the Foreign 
Office.  When Fischer was beginning his street-fighting in the mid 1960s, Schröder was 
pursuing his law degree and idealizing Chancellor Willy Brandt. Brandt’s Ostpolitik 
(East-Politics) was a strong influence on Schröder and inspired his attempts to bring 
Germany closer to Eastern Europe.  Backed by the popularity of Fischer and his Greens, 
Schröder guided their coalition on a left-center path: approving the dismantling of 
Germany’s nineteen nuclear power stations over a twenty-year period171 and providing 
initial support for the United States’ war on terror (support which was publicly unpopular 
in Germany).  Schröder and Fischer, neither an avowed pacifist, steered Germany back to 
the more popular anti-war, anti-military position in time to be narrowly re-elected in 
2002.172  Within three years, Schröder’s emphasis on Ostpolitik and a mishandling of visa 
reform by Fischer’s office would mean the end of the 68er administration. 
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 This 68er administration was the first German government since 1945 that had no 
direct ties to either World War II or the Nazis.  Thirty years from their defining moment, 
the 68ers took control of the establishment, with Fischer carrying much of the popularity.  
But the scruffy, long-haired rebel was no longer visible; instead, the 68er administration 
presented a clean-cut, Italian-suited visage to the world.  Fischer entered politics as the 
casual street-fighter, even wearing sneakers to his swearing-in in the early 1980s.  Once 
achieving real power in the German government in the 1990s, however, Fischer shed his 
rebellious past and gritty image for that of a polished, suit-adorned political leader.  The 
student radicals and street-fighters appeared to have matured and left their radicalism 
behind, something Bettina Röhl and some members of the German press interpreted as 
hypocrisy. 
The Fischer Affair 
 In January 2001, two events collided to create what the news media dubbed the 
Fischer Affair.  Bettina Röhl had presented the press with what appeared to be 
incriminating photographs of Joschka Fischer attacking a police officer in the early 
1970s.  Concurrently, Fischer was called as a witness in the murder trial of former 68er-
turned-terrorist, Hans-Joachim Klein. 
 Bettina Röhl173, the daughter of RAF terrorist Ulrike Meinhof, was compiling 
information for a book about her mother and the RAF when she came upon old photos of 
Fischer in his street-fighting days.  In the 1960s, Ulrike Meinhof and Bettina Röhl’s 
father, Klaus Rainer Röhl, published the leftist magazine Konkret in West Germany.  
Five years after contributing to the so-called Fischer Affair, Bettina Röhl published an 
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exposé of her parents and their magazine designed to reveal its communist base and the 
links between Konkret, East Germany and the 68ers.174  Calling her mother an “East-
obsessed 26-year-old brat” and her father a “useful idiot,” Röhl had dedicated a majority 
of her journalism to exposing the motivations behind her extremist parents and other 
1960s’ radicals like Joschka Fischer.175  On her website, Röhl explained that her purpose 
for publishing the eleven photographs was to unmask the “fraud” of Joschka Fischer.  
The pictures were taken during a demonstration in Frankfurt in 1973 by Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung photographer, Lutz Kleinhans.  Röhl questioned why it took twenty-
seven years for these images to reach the public; her conclusion was a Fischer-based 
conspiracy to hide his violent past.176  The scene in the photos was described by Röhl for 
a book entitled, Sag Mir, wo Du stehst: 
At the beginning of April 1973, there was a large 
demonstration.  Joschka Fischer tackled a policeman and 
set the overwhelming scenario [Überwältigungsszenario] in 
motion, as had been practiced.  In the following seconds, he 
and four of his comrades-in-arms [Kampfgenossen] 
surrounded the policeman on the ground.  Fischer raised his 
hand to strike.  The event was interrupted when two fellow 
police officers rushed in and grabbed the weapon.177 
 
 When interviewed by Stern about his past, Fischer stated that he had been a 
militant and a street-fighter and had never denied the fact, but he vehemently denied ever 
attacking police with weapons.  Fischer stated that he fought government authority but 
also “fought against the pressure of events that was causing some to break away in the 
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mid 70s and go underground.”178  Hans-Joachim Klein, Fischer’s friend and Mitläufer 
(nominal member) in the street-fighting scene, was one of those breaking away to 
become more radical.  When asked if he felt responsible for Klein’s descent into 
terrorism, Fischer denied having any negative influence over either Klein or the other 
more violent members of the 68er protests.  Stern asked Fischer to explain to young 
Germans how he could have participated in demonstrations that had frequently turned 
violent. 
Vietnam, Notstandgesetzte, the attempted assassination of 
Rudi Dutschke, the suspicious continuity between the Nazi 
state and the Federal Republic.  …We encountered so much 
hate when we demonstrated for freedom.  If you go 
demonstrating today, you no longer hear: ‘Go away!’ [Geh 
nach drüben!].  That was only the most harmless variant.  
‘Off to the labor camp!’ [Ab ins Arbeitslager!] or ‘You 
should be gassed!’ [Ihr gehört vergast!], we heard that a 
lot.  …I got my first five weeks without probation because 
of resistance against government authority [Widerstand 
gegen die Staatsgewalt], disturbing the peace 
[Landfriedensbruch], and violation of the 
Bannmeilengesetz179.  …All these events.  They [today’s 
youth] must see the general context.  …For us, the German 
democracy appeared to show a National Socialist face 
again.  …That set us on the path where the question of 
enmity in relation to the state was no longer a question of 
theory, but where one wanted the complete fall of the 
constitutional order—that sounds so crazy today.180 
 
 The violence of the 68ers’ conflict with authority continued to escalate until it 
erupted in the 1970s.  Several 68ers, including Hans-Joachim Klein, became violently 
anti-Israel.  Two Frankfurt Germans participated in the 1976 hijacking of the Air France 
flight where the Jewish passengers were separated from the other passengers and killed.  
                                                
178 “Ja, ich war militant,” Stern, 4 January 2001. 
179 A law that created protected zones around such government buildings as the Bundestag and the Federal 
Constitutional Court.  This law prohibited gatherings and other such activities in such areas.  “Bannmeile,” 
Juraform.  Available from http://www.juraform.de/lexikon/Bannmeile; accessed 25 July 2007. 
180 “Ja, ich war militant,” Stern, 4 January 2001. 
 80
Such actions disillusioned Fischer and others.  Fischer described the murders of the 
passengers as “disgustingly terrible.”181 Severe anti-Semitism also became Klein’s reason 
for leaving the violence behind.  He became disillusioned with anti-Zionism during a 
training stint in the Middle East.  Klein told Daniel Cohn-Bendit (fellow 68er and friend 
to both Klein and Fischer) that he and the other militant leftists were being trained next to 
fascists at the camp.  Klein claimed to be shocked that the Palestinian cause was not the 
anti-fascist, anti-Nazi one he had believed it to be.  Rather, it was simply an anti-Jewish 
cause.182  A similar shock ran through the German New Left at the discovery of the 
identity of the Air France hijackers killed at Entebbe.  When the terrorist leader was 
revealed as Wilfried Böse, Fischer was dumbfounded that a friend of his would resort to 
such anti-Zionist violence.183  
 By the mid 1970s, with the drastic increase in leftist terrorism, the idealism was 
being drained from the 68er revolution.  Actions began to have dire and often bloody 
consequences.  The bloodshed at Entebbe was a direct result of the anti-Semitic, anti-
Israel resolutions passed at the PLO conference in Algeria, which Fischer had attended in 
1969.  The 68er revolution had mutated from sit-ins, demonstrations, and pamphleteering 
to kidnapping and murder.  The increasingly violent nature of some members of the New 
Left made Fischer extremely uncomfortable.  He recognized the fine line the 68ers were 
walking when resorting to any kind of violence.  Declaring that he had never been a 
pacifist, Fischer, as Foreign Minister, acknowledged repeatedly the necessity of the use 
of force in certain situations.  The Foreign Minister illustrated his belief when he 
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supported armed NATO action in the former Yugoslavia to end the genocide there, 
saying, “The answer to Auschwitz is not never again war but never again Auschwitz.”184  
However, he also understood the dangers that any use of force contained for his 
generation.  The year 1976 represented for Fischer a terrible hypocrisy: his generation 
was stepping over the same line they had accused their parents of crossing. 
 When questioned about his past, Fischer, both in the press and on the witness 
stand at Klein’s murder trial, apologized for the violence of the radical 1960s and 70s.  
He lamented that any of the 68ers had turned to killing.  In January 2001, Hans-Joachim 
Klein was tried for the 1975 murders of three officials participating in the OPEC 
conference in Vienna.  The Foreign Minister appeared as a character witness for the 
defense and was questioned by the prosecution about violence in his own radical past.  In 
a symbolic and a very real way, the 68ers were on trial.  One 68er who had turned his 
youthful idealism into terrorism and murder had as a character witness another 68er who 
had fashioned his own youthful idealism into a high-ranking position in the very 
establishment they had both once fought against.  On the stand, Fischer described the 
initial 68er motive as a desire to organize a Gegenwelt (counter culture).  Both on the 
stand and in the Stern interview, Fischer explained that their youth was a different life, a 
different time and place.  In the interview, the Foreign Minister never acceded to 
committing any real violence beyond throwing a few stones.  The most he admitted to 
Stern was “resisting” the police.  At Klein’s trial, Fischer was questioned repeatedly 
about throwing Molotov cocktails at police, an allegation Bettina Röhl had made about 
Fischer in the press.  Prosecutor Volker Rath confronted Fischer with having allegedly 
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admitted to such actions on television.  Fischer denied having thrown the flaming 
projectiles and denied ever inciting the Frankfurt street-fighters to do so themselves.  
Rath then mentioned a statement allegedly made by one of Fischer’s former roommates 
and provided to the prosecutor’s office by Bettina Röhl.  Rath claimed that the statement 
provided proof that what the prosecutor called the Fischer Wohngemeinschaft (Fischer 
Commune) was the fertile ground for the RAF.  Fischer dismissed the statement as 
Völliger Quatsch (complete rubbish) while the judge declared it irrelevant.  Rath then 
accused Fischer again of throwing Molotov cocktails and avoiding the question.  Fischer 
replied: “No you don’t.  I don’t evade anything.  I exclude.  Clear.  Explicit.  Period.”185 
 The Röhl photographs and Fischer’s testimony at the Klein trial expanded into 
threats of parliamentary inquiries and criminal investigations.  The Foreign Minister’s 
irreverent attitude toward many of his political fellows had not gained him many friends 
in the German government.  Some, particularly those in the opposition parties, saw an 
opportunity to discredit Fischer and the Red/Green Coalition.186  However, throughout 
the Fischer Affair, the Foreign Minister remained extremely popular with the German 
public.  Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, the former Young Socialist, defended his 
irreverent friend and the young radicals of their generation: “This republic would be quite 
different without the 68ers.  It would lack the general openness with regard to many 
social-political questions, including questions as to the causes of fascism.”187  The 68ers 
were once more center-stage but had come under scrutiny for their own histories.  No 
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longer the new generation, the former radicals were the ones being forced to provide an 
account of their pasts.  Fischer’s former roommate and France’s most prominent 68er, 
Daniel Cohn-Bendit, was quoted as saying: “At long last there is a German politician 
who says, ‘Yes, it was me;’” ironically, the same thing Hitler said at his trial in 1924.  
Along with this approbation for Fischer’s admission, Cohn-Bendit expressed 
dissatisfaction with the absence of other politicians willing to admit to Communist or 
Nazi pasts.188  While friends spoke out in support of the Foreign Minister, Bettina Röhl 
and Michael Schwelien (Fischer biographer) openly accused Fischer of deliberately 
encouraging and participating in violence against police at demonstrations in the 1960s 
and 1970s.189 
 Fischer supporters and Fischer detractors lined up on either side of a generational 
debate: was a radical and (disputably) violent past acceptable in Germany’s politicians of 
today if it was unacceptable in Germany’s politicians of thirty years ago?  The Fischer 
Affair represented the next step in the generational conflict begun by Fischer’s 
generation. 
The main subject in the Fischer affair was a simple political 
scandal involving a well-regarded foreign minister.  But the 
scandal was set against a background consisting of events 
from twenty-five or thirty years earlier, from the time of the 
New Left.  The Fischer affair invited us, even required us, 
to make a few judgments about that background.  But the 
New Left background turned out, on closer inspection, to 
have a background of its own….  Not the generation of 
1968, but the generation of 1938.  Not the New Left, but 
the Nazis.190 
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 In Fischer’s youth, anyone with a definably National Socialist background was 
unacceptable in any public office.  His generation was imminently instrumental in 
exposing the objectionable histories of a number of West Germany’s most prominent 
politicians, including Chancellor Kiesinger.  But, while Joschka Fischer may have never 
attempted to hide his own radical past, he, like his parents’ generation before him, made 
no attempt to address it directly until the issue was forced by the next generation.  It was 
not until 2001 that Fischer discussed or analyzed his own past openly.  A published 
author by 2001, his book was not about the student revolts or the Frankfurt street-
fighters; rather, it was about his life-affirming weight-loss.191  The Röhl photographs and 
the Klein trial forced Fischer and the 68er administration to answer the question, “where 
were you then and what did you do?”  
The Visa Affair 
 The 68er administration would survive the Fischer Affair of 2001 with popularity 
and reputation largely intact.  However, in 2005, the German Foreign Office came under 
heavy attack when a loophole in recent immigration legislation was discovered by the 
press, though that legislation had actually been revoked a year earlier.  In an effort to 
further relations with former Eastern Bloc countries, Fischer’s Foreign Office had 
modified its immigration policies and procedures in March 2000 under the “Volmer 
Edict”.192  The edict relaxed the restrictions for accepting tourist visas in Germany.  The 
mandate from Fischer’s office to all German consulates was, “when in doubt, decide for 
freedom of travel.”  By the next year, over 300,000 Ukrainians had applied for tourist 
visas with only ten percent rejected.  One of the main concerns at the time was the 11% 
                                                
191 “Never a pacifist,” Time International, 22 January 2001. 
192 Named for then Deputy Foreign Minister Ludger Volmer. 
 85
unemployment rate in Germany.  Some German officials were worried that a large 
number of these foreign tourists would become de facto immigrants, which would then 
further exacerbate the unemployment issue Chancellor Schröder had promised to 
address.193 
 Even worse than the unemployment issue was that, unfortunately, the new visa 
policy allowed a large number of criminals into Germany indefinitely, including known 
human-traffickers and members of prostitution rings.  Relaxing the policy on temporary 
visa approval in favor of the applicant had flooded the consulates with a large number of 
requests they were not staffed to handle; requests that were then rubber-stamped without 
the proper background checks.  This allowed young women forced into sexual slavery to 
enter the country as “tourists” and pimps to pass as “business travelers.”194 
 Fellow European Union Schengen Agreement member states began to complain 
to Berlin that lax German visa regulations were impacting them as well.  The Schengen 
Agreement of 1985 involved thirty European nation-states, including Germany.  In 1995, 
Germany and five other European countries including France and Spain officially 
implemented Schengen, which meant that once legally in one Schengen member nation, a 
person could move freely through all other Schengen participant nations without further 
passport checks.195  If criminals were entering Germany legally, then by extension, they 
could move freely in France, Spain, and many other nations, without need of separate 
French or Spanish visas.  In 2004, under pressure from these other Schengen nations, 
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Germany revoked the Volmer Edict.  Deputy Foreign Minister Volmer, when questioned 
about Germany’s visa policy change, alternated between taking all the blame on himself 
and placing the majority of it on Fischer, saying that Fischer had forced him to change 
the regulations in 2000 despite his own misgivings.196 
 The Visa Affair was the second time in less than five years that Foreign Minister 
and former 68er Joschka Fischer occupied an unfavorable spotlight.  The Süddeutsche 
Zeitung posed the question: “To what extent was it really Green ideological blindness 
which damaged German interests because it simply dismissed the many warnings?”197  
As the head of one half of the Red/Green Coalition, Fischer came under attack for his 
administration’s idealism.  Germany’s relationship with its Gastarbeiteren (guest 
workers) and immigrants had been shaky at best and throughout the 1990s attacks on 
immigrants had increased in the more heavily populated areas of Germany.  The 
Red/Green Coalition had intended to establish Germany officially as an immigrant nation 
in the new millennium.  By encouraging the immigration of Eastern Europeans, Fischer 
intended not only to support Schröder’s relationship with those nations but also perhaps 
to atone for the sin of Auschwitz.198 
 Altruism aside, as an investigative committee and the news media dug deeper into 
the stacks of visa applications and consulate paperwork, a growing number of infractions 
were discovered with some of the more serious ones involving Albania.  After the 
introduction of the Volmer Edict in 2000, the number of approved visas coming from 
Tirana increased by over 10,000, jumping from 8,000 to 19,000.  During the 
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investigation, stacks of bribe money were found hidden in between the applications while 
some approved applications had never been signed by the applicants.  This led Berlin to 
believe that the German consulate in Albania was being used as a human-trafficking 
weigh-station.199  Over 800,000 Germans watched as Fischer gave testimony before a 
parliamentary investigative committee in 2005.  The Financial Times Deutschland 
remarked on Fischer’s twelve-hour testimony: “He was quite the old Joschka Fischer—
belligerent, lacking respect, eloquent and witty.  But his show was being played out in the 
wrong theater.  It was all about how far he is responsible for mass human trafficking 
offences and from this point of view he wasn’t convincing.”200  The negative publicity of 
the Visa Affair became a storm that Fischer and the 68er administration could not ignore. 
 All of this reflected very badly on a Foreign Minister, an administration, and two 
political parties that had prided themselves on humanitarianism and opposition to 
oppression.  The mainstream German press accused Fischer of ignoring a potentially 
dangerous issue while more extreme accusations of supporting international prostitution 
and slave trading flowed toward Germany from the international press.  Unfortunately for 
the 68er administration, the explosive Visa Affair hit them during an election year.  
Neither Fischer, nor the rest of the Schröder administration survived the Visa Affair 
intact the way they had the Fischer Affair involving controversial photographs and a 
sensational murder trial four years earlier.  German voters expressed their lack of 
confidence in the 68ers by voting them out of government in 2005.  The long march of 
the 68ers had come to an end. 
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Their administration is currently being analyzed, but what is the real legacy of the 
German 68ers?  They progenerated the frank discussions of National Socialism taking 
place in Germany today.  Their legacy also lies in the galvanization of Germany’s 
commitment to anti-fascism and behind every one of the memorials to the victims of the 
Third Reich.  They helped establish the equality of the sexes that elected a female 
chancellor and inspired a commitment to improving immigrant relations and citizenship 
reform.  The 68ers opened the eyes of a nation and ensured that Germany’s past will 
never be ignored or forgotten.  
 89
CHAPTER 5 
MARCH CONCLUDED? 
 
 The 68ers, famous for their student protests in favor of democracy, for their 
confrontation of their parents’ Nazi history, and, notoriously, for the violence of the 
1970s, were extremely popular in 1998 when Schröder’s administration took power.  But 
their latest legacy was unfavorably marked by rising unemployment and a serious 
mishandling of visa reform.  In 2001, the most popular member of the 68er government, 
Joschka Fischer, was confronted with his own violent past in much the same way as he 
and his compatriots confronted the National Socialist generation.  In 2005, the long 
march through the institutions came to an end as the so-called Visa Affair broke and the 
68er administration was voted out of power.  Following his coalition’s election defeat, 
Joschka Fischer resigned from politics altogether; taking up, instead, a teaching post at 
Princeton University in 2006.  Rounding out an incredibly dynamic career, Fischer went 
from being a drop-out autodidact, to a street-fighter, to Foreign Minister and Vice-
Chancellor of Germany, to professor of “International Crisis Diplomacy” at one of the 
United States’ most prestigious universities.201   
 What kind of mark these former young radicals will continue to make on 
Germany remains to be seen.  “Although some aspects of the 1960s’ baby boom 
liberalism is now deeply rooted in German society, in many other respects 1968er 
radicalism (moderated with age) seems to have passed through the system leaving few 
marks on the successor generation.”202  The time of the 68ers had passed, as evidenced by 
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the election of the more conservative CDU government and Chancellor Angela Merkel.  
Will there be a new study of the National Socialist period through the lens of a new 
generation standing on the other side of the impassioned 68er protest?  Maybe yes, 
maybe no.  The new generation, “many of whom are indifferent or even hostile to the 
values of the 1968ers,” is less interested in confronting Germany’s Nazi past and 
practicing 68er idealism than it is interested in solving unemployment and reforming the 
German economy.  This new generation does not have to confront Germany’s past in 
order to take their place in their nation.  They do not have to fight against remnant Nazis 
in power, they way their parents did.  Germany’s youth are more concerned with world 
conflict and the environment.  In 2006, despite being defeated by the CDU, the Green 
Party still held fifty percent of the under-twenty-five-year-old vote.203  Those voters 
represent the first generation of Germans to grow up in a Germany involved in a dialogue 
with its National Socialist past.  By the turn of the last century, there were approximately 
four thousand museums in Germany which displayed exhibits concerning some aspect of 
the Second World War and the Third Reich.  By the year 2000, Germany was spending 
DM 115 million a year on Holocaust memorials.204  Rather than having to fight silent 
shadows to learn about the past, today’s Germans are immersed in their nation’s history, 
thanks to the efforts of the 68ers throughout the years.205 
 The 68ers’ confrontation with the past has left a deep mark in every corner of 
German society, but their path was not always clear.  Their long march through the 
                                                
203 Jane Paulick, “Germany Sheds the Spirit of ’68,” Deutsche Welle, 14 October 2005.  Available from 
http://www.dw-world.de, s.v. “Joschka Fischer;” accessed 20 August 2007. 
204 Michael Naumann, “Remembrance and Political Reality: Historical Consciousness in Germany after the 
Genocide,” New German Critique, no. 80, Special Issue on the Holocaust (Spring—Summer 2000): 21-22.  
Database online.  http://www.jstor.org, s.v. “Vergangenheitsbewältigung;” accessed 4 June 2007. 
205Kundnani, “Goodbye to the 68ers,” Prospect, 28 July 2005. 
 91
institutions had been, at times, a confusing one.  In 1999 when NATO attacked Slobodan 
Milosevic in Belgrade, Joschka Fischer publicly supported the action and Germany sent 
in its own air support.  Fischer characterized his support as a uniquely German 
responsibility to oppose genocide wherever found.  His Green Party strongly dissented 
and Fischer was hit with a red paint bomb at the 1999 Green Party conference in protest 
against the military action Fischer had sanctioned.  Instead of adhering to his political 
party’s dedicated pacifism, Fischer, in a throw-back to his radical past, decided that no 
action was worse than intervention.   
 With the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, Schröder, backed by 
his 68er administration, declared “unconditional solidarity” with the U.S. and promised 
support in the U.S.’s war on terror.  Overcoming a vote of no confidence in the 
Bundestag, the 68er administration sent troops to Afghanistan.  Then, in 2002, Schröder 
and Fischer opposed the proposed American attack on Iraq.  In concert with German 
public opinion, Schröder and Fischer refused to support a war on Iraq, with Fischer 
returning to the German Green Party mantra of “never again war;” this time without the 
“never again Auschwitz” emphasis.206 
 The new, younger German government of 2006 has promised to draw Germany 
closer to the United States and to establish a more comprehensive, Western-based foreign 
policy than Fischer and Schröder’s Ostpolitik-inspired approach.  Unlike the prior 
administration, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government is not based in 1968.  Rather, 
the new government takes 1989 and reunification as its springboard.  The German voters 
in 2005 appeared to be seeking more stability than the 68ers gave them, electing instead a 
chancellor who favors the conservative values of Adenauer’s administration, the very 
                                                
206 Kundnani, “Goodbye to the 68ers,” Prospect, 28 July 2005. 
 92
thing the 68ers opposed.  But, the very fact that Germany’s chancellor is female is 
another nod to all that the 68ers managed to change.  The 68ers protested against their 
parents’ silence and governmental hypocrisy, they protested in favor of sexual liberation 
and equal treatment for women.  The 68ers created the society and government that 
Angela Merkel and the new generation has inherited.207 
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